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REFRAMING THE (FALSE?) CHOICE BETWEEN
PURCHASER WELFARE AND TOTAL WELFARE
Alan J. Meese*
This Article critiques the role that the partial equilibrium trade-off
paradigm plays in the debate over the definition of “consumer welfare”
that courts should employ when developing and applying antitrust doctrine.
The Article contends that common reliance on the paradigm distorts the
debate between those who would equate “consumer welfare” with “total
welfare” and those who equate consumer welfare with “purchaser
welfare.” In particular, the model excludes, by fiat, the fact that new
efficiencies free up resources that flow to other markets, increasing output
and thus the welfare of purchasers in those markets. Moreover, the model
also assumes that both the positive and negative impacts of a transaction
are permanent and occur immediately and simultaneously. As a result, the
model excludes the (very real) possibility that subsequent entry will
undermine or mitigate any market power, leaving only efficiencies that
benefit purchasers in the original market.
Removal of these unrealistic assumptions requires the antitrust
community to reframe the debate about the appropriate welfare standard
for antitrust and could require adjustment of the standards applied to
practices that both raise prices and create efficiencies in the relevant
market. For instance, recognition that efficiencies generated in one market
cause resource flows to other markets and higher output in such markets
undermines claims that producers “pocket” efficiencies whenever a
practice results in higher prices. Thus, instead of involving a conflict
between “producers” and “purchasers” in a single market, transactions
that both raise prices and create efficiencies require antitrust policy to
resolve a conflict between purchasers in the original market, on the one
hand, and those in other markets, on the other. In the same way, the
realization that the trade-off model ignores the passage of time requires
antitrust policy to resolve a conflict between current and future purchasers
in the original market.

* Ball Professor of Law, William and Mary Law School. The author is grateful to Sarah
Stafford for enlightening discussions about the project.
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INTRODUCTION
Rational implementation of the antitrust laws requires courts and the
enforcement agencies to identify, articulate, and apply some organizing
principle when developing doctrine that governs antitrust disputes. For
instance, application of the Sherman Act’s “Rule of Reason” requires courts
and enforcers to ascertain the distinction between “reasonable” and
“unreasonable” restraints. Moreover, the Clayton Act’s ban on mergers or
exclusive agreements that “substantially lessen competition” requires courts
to articulate and enforce a preferred version of “competition.” Finally,
courts enforcing section 2 of the Sherman Act, which bans
“monopolization” and not merely “monopoly,” must determine what sort of
economic effect distinguishes old-fashioned rivalry from “unlawful
exclusion” necessary to a finding of monopolization.
Most scholars, judges, and enforcement officials have endorsed
“consumer welfare” as this organizing principle. Under a “consumer
welfare” standard, courts would fashion antitrust doctrine governing
restraints, mergers, or unilateral conduct so as to ban only those practices
that reduce such welfare, while leaving those that do not unscathed. Such
an approach roughly tracks that announced in Standard Oil Co. of New
Jersey v. United States,1 where the Court held that the sections 1 and 2 of
the Sherman Act ban all agreements or unilateral practices that produce
“monopoly or its consequences,” which the Court equated with increased
prices, reduced quality, or reduced output. All other practices, the Court
said, were “normal” or “usual” practices that forwarded, increased, or
fructified trade and thus did not violate the Sherman Act.
At the same time, “consumer welfare” (or, for that matter, “the
consequences of monopoly”) means different things to different people. In
particular, some equate “consumer welfare” with the welfare of all
1. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
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consumers in society, while others equate “consumer welfare” with the
welfare of purchasers in the relevant market governed by the challenged
restraint, merger, or unilateral practice. The first definition of “consumer
welfare” is really a “total welfare” standard, while the second definition is
best described as a “purchaser welfare” standard. That is, the first treats the
only harmful consequence of monopoly as output reduction and resulting
misallocation of resources and deadweight loss, while the second treats all
reductions in purchaser welfare, including price increases, as harmful.
Under the first definition, courts would only ban those restraints that reduce
society’s overall welfare or, more technically, are “inefficient” in a KaldorHicks sense. Under the second definition, by contrast, courts would ban
any restraint that reduces the “consumer surplus” of purchasers in the
relevant market, even if the restraint increases the welfare of producers by a
greater amount.
The choice between these two standards often will not matter for antitrust
doctrine. After all, most commercial conduct increases welfare according
to either definition, or at least does not reduce it. Moreover, some conduct
reduces welfare under both definitions. At the same time, there is a subset
of conduct that a “purchaser welfare” standard would condemn, but that a
“total welfare” approach would leave unscathed and even applaud. In
particular, some conduct will both increase prices and also create
efficiencies that outweigh any deadweight losses, thereby increasing overall
welfare but reducing the welfare of purchasers in the relevant market.
Moreover, the choice between enforcement regimes, as well as the amount
invested in enforcement, necessarily turns on the regime’s account of
“antitrust harm,” which, in turn, depends upon one’s choice between
competing definitions of “consumer welfare.”
The choice between competing definitions of “consumer welfare” is
ultimately a normative one; economic theory cannot make the choice for us.
At the same time, such theory can inform or frame the debate in a way that
might influence the normative outcome. This Article argues that economic
theory has done exactly that, namely, framed the choice between these two
standards in a manner that creates a misleading or at least incomplete
debate. In particular, the Article examines the influence of Oliver
Williamson’s partial equilibrium trade-off model, first developed to
examine the welfare consequences of mergers and other practices that both
increase prices and create efficiencies that reduce costs.
Ironically, both consumer welfare schools invoke Williamson’s model
when articulating their competing approaches. Thus, the total welfare camp
invokes the model to illustrate how practices that create market power and
higher prices can nonetheless increase overall welfare by producing
efficiencies that counteract the deadweight allocative losses resulting from
enhanced market power. Where the welfare impact of efficiencies exceeds
that of deadweight losses, they contend, courts should validate the practice,
even if it raises prices. At the same time, the purchaser welfare school
employs the partial equilibrium model to illustrate the concept of consumer
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surplus, which this school of thought treats as the appropriate maximand for
antitrust. This school of thought also invokes this model to frame the
normative choice as involving a trade-off between the welfare of producers,
on the one hand, and consumers, on the other. In so doing, both camps
implicitly or explicitly invoke various assumptions of the trade-off model,
including, for instance, the assumption that the studied transaction has no
impact beyond the relevant market.
This Article offers a critique of the role of the partial equilibrium
paradigm in antitrust’s normative debate. More precisely, the Article
contends that common reliance on the partial equilibrium paradigm distorts
the normative debate over appropriate welfare standards. As shown, the
partial equilibrium trade-off model excludes, by fiat, the impact of the
transaction or practice under scrutiny upon other markets. In particular, the
model intentionally ignores the fact that realization of efficiencies frees up
resources that necessarily flow to other markets, increasing output and thus
increasing the welfare of purchasers in those markets. Moreover, the model
also assumes that both the positive and negative impacts of a transaction are
permanent and occur immediately and simultaneously. As a result, the
model excludes the (very real) possibility that subsequent entry will
undermine or mitigate any market power, leaving only efficiencies that
benefit purchasers in the original market.
Removal of these unrealistic assumptions requires the antitrust
community to reframe the debate about the appropriate welfare standard for
antitrust and could require adjustment of the standards applied to such
restraints. For instance, recognition that efficiencies generated in one
market result in resource flows to other markets and higher output in such
markets undermines any argument based on a claim that producers “pocket”
efficiencies whenever an efficiency-creating transaction results in higher
prices. Thus, instead of involving a conflict between “producers” and
“purchasers” in a single market, transactions that both raise prices and
create efficiencies require antitrust law and policy to resolve a conflict
between purchasers in the original market, on the one hand, and those in
other markets, on the other. In the same way, the realization that the partial
equilibrium model ignores the passage of time requires antitrust law and
policy to resolve a conflict between current purchasers in the original
market and those individuals who might purchase in that market in the
future. This more nuanced and complete understanding of “what is at
stake” where such transactions are concerned may help explain courts’
seemingly ambiguous attitude toward the choice between the two
competing definitions of “consumer welfare.”
Part I of this Article reviews the two competing definitions of “consumer
welfare” articulated by the academic community and examines which
version(s), if any, courts have adopted. Part II explains how both the
“purchaser welfare” and “total welfare” camps embrace the partial
equilibrium trade-off model, along with its various restrictive assumptions,
employing the model to frame their respective positions. Part III outlines
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the trade-off model. Part IV examines the shortcomings of the model as
applied to efficient conduct that also increases prices. Part V explains how
these shortcomings require the antitrust community to reframe the debate
between the purchaser welfare and total welfare schools of thought. This
part also offers suggestions for changes in the standards governing efficient
but price-raising conduct.
I. THE COMPETING DEFINITIONS OF CONSUMER WELFARE:
TOTAL WELFARE OR PURCHASER WELFARE
For more than three decades, most scholars, judges, and enforcement
officials have endorsed “consumer welfare” as antitrust law’s organizing
principle.2 Under this approach, courts would fashion antitrust doctrine so
as to ban only those practices that reduce such welfare, leaving all other
conduct unscathed and subject to market discipline and regulation by other
bodies of law.3 Implementation of this goal roughly tracks the normative
content of the Rule of Reason, announced in Standard Oil v. United States
States.4 According to Standard Oil, the Sherman Act bans those
agreements, and only those agreements, that restrain trade “unduly” by
producing monopoly or “the consequences of monopoly.”5 Moreover, the
decision defined such consequences as entailing higher prices, reduced
quality, or reduced output.6
At the same time, there is substantial disagreement about the meaning of
“consumer welfare” and thus the relevance to antitrust analysis of various

2. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 81–89 (1978); HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE
83–86 (4th ed. 2011); Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act,
9 J.L. & ECON. 7 (1966) (contending that Congress intended maximization of “consumer
welfare” or “consumer want satisfaction” to serve as the principle guiding development of
Sherman Act doctrine); Robert Lande, Wealth Transfers As the Original and Primary
Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65
(1982); Barak Y. Orbach, The Antitrust Consumer Welfare Paradox, 7 J. COMP. L. & ECON.
133, 133–34 (2010) (“All antitrust lawyers and economists know that the stated instrumental
goal of antitrust laws is ‘consumer welfare,’ which is a defined term in economics.”); Robert
Pitofsky, Past, Present and Future of Antitrust Enforcement at the Federal Trade
Commission, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 209, 217 (2005) (contending that the welfare of consumers
should drive enforcement priorities); Steven C. Salop, Exclusionary Conduct, Effect on
Consumers, and the Flawed Profit Sacrifice Standard, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 311, 329–33
(2006) (endorsing a so-called “consumer welfare effect standard” whereby courts determine
whether a restraint, on balance, injures purchasers in the relevant market); see also Reiter v.
Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (“[The debates in Congress] suggest that
Congress designed the Sherman Act as a ‘consumer welfare prescription.’” (citing BORK,
supra, at 66)); Chicago Prof. Sports Ltd. v. NBA, 961 F.2d 667 (7th Cir. 1992) (Sherman
Act only bans restraints that reduce “consumer welfare”).
3. See, e.g., BORK, supra note at 2, at 81–89, 107–15.
4. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
5. See id. at 55–57.
6. Id. at 52 (listing these three evils of monopoly, which led to condemnation at
common law).
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possible impacts of conduct subject to antitrust scrutiny.7 Not surprisingly,
some scholars would (quite naturally) equate consumer welfare with the
welfare of purchasers and potential purchasers in the particular market
potentially impacted by the challenged restraint—a conception that
emphasizes the distributional effects of challenged restraints.8 These
scholars contend that courts should ban any practice that reduces the
welfare of such purchasers, even if the practice results in a more efficient
allocation of resources and thus increases the total welfare of society. Put
more technically, these scholars would equate “consumer welfare” with the
“consumer surplus” generated in the particular market governed by a
restraint, thereby ignoring the welfare of that same market’s producers.9
7. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 83–86; (discussing two different conceptions of
“consumer welfare” potentially relevant to antitrust analysis); Orbach, supra note 2, at 137–
38 (“[T]oday, there are two major groups of thoughts [about how to define consumer
welfare]: one argues that the term should mean ‘consumer surplus,’ and the other asserts
that the appropriate meaning is ‘total surplus’ or ‘aggregate welfare.’”).
8. See Joseph F. Brodley, The Economic Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Consumer
Welfare, and Technological Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1020, 1020 (1987); Aaron S. Edlin,
Predatory Pricing, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON ECONOMICS OF ANTITRUST LAW 144
(Edward Elgar ed., 4th ed. 2012) (embracing such a purchaser-centric definition of
“consumer welfare”); John B. Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande, The Fundamental Goal of
Antitrust: Protecting Consumers, Not Increasing Efficiency, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 191
(2008) (same); Pitofsky, supra note 2, at 217 (endorsing a comparison of efficiency effects
with adverse impacts on consumers in the market served by the monopolist); Salop, supra
note 2, at 329–33 (endorsing the so-called “consumer welfare effect standard,” whereby
courts determine whether a restraint, on balance, injures purchasers in the relevant market);
see also HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 85–86 (apparently endorsing this definition of
consumer welfare). But see Herbert Hovenkamp, Exclusion and the Sherman Act, 72 U. CHI.
L. REV. 147, 148 (2005) (advocating a test whereby the court weighs the harm to purchasers
against the benefits of the challenged practice and bans the practice when harms are
disproportionate to the benefits). One scholar has suggested a compromise of sorts between
these two approaches. See generally Jonathan B. Baker, Competition Policy As a Political
Bargain, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 483 (2006) (contending that antitrust law should ban all
practices that injure consumers in the relevant market unless doing so would sacrifice very
large efficiencies in a particular case).
9. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 85 n.17 (explaining how this version of “consumer
welfare” focuses on the maximization of consumer surplus in a particular market and thus
ignores the impact of a practice on the welfare of producers); Brodley, supra note 8, at 1033
(“However, if consumer welfare is to serve as an operational principle of antitrust law, it
must refer to the direct and explicit economic benefits received by the consumers of a
particular product as measured by its price and quality. Using the more precise language of
economics, consumer welfare can be defined as consumer surplus, which is that part of the
total surplus that accrues to consumers.”). As Barak Orbach has explained, a “consumer
surplus” approach to antitrust depends upon the identification of a relevant market and
subsequent assessment of the welfare of consumers in that market. See Orbach, supra note 2,
at 138–39. Presumably the “relevant market” for this purpose consists of the market treated
as “relevant” for purposes of the appropriate antitrust analysis of the challenged restraint
(e.g., the “market” that a defendant has allegedly monopolized in violation of section 2 of the
Sherman Act or the market where a merger allegedly substantially lessens competition). See
15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006) (forbidding monopolization, attempted monopolization, and conspiracy
to monopolize “any part of the trade or commerce among the several States”); id. § 18
(forbidding mergers that tend substantially to lessen competition or create a monopoly in any
“line of commerce or in any activity affecting commerce in any section of the country”). Of
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For these scholars, antitrust law should ban all practices that reduce
consumer surplus and should thus be agnostic about the efficient allocation
of resources. In fact, such an approach is downright hostile to such
efficiency if the realization of efficiency requires reduction of consumer
surplus.10
At the same time, some other advocates expressly employ the term to
refer to the welfare of all individuals in society, without regard to whether
an individual actually “consumes” the product whose price, output, or
quality the challenged practice affects.11 Indeed, members of this camp go
so far as to include as “consumers” the shareholders of firms that have
adopted a challenged practice or transaction. Supporters of this approach
note that “shareholders are people too” and that there is no reason to ignore
their welfare when evaluating a restraint or crafting antitrust doctrine, even
if any increase in their welfare includes supracompetitive profits that result

course, in some instances, no overt market definition is necessary; the prime example is
horizontal price fixing, where the law assumes that the agreement itself defines the extent of
the market. See FTC v. Super. Ct. Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 435 n.18 (1990)
(“‘Very few firms that lack power to affect market prices will be sufficiently foolish to enter
into conspiracies to fix prices. Thus, the fact of agreement defines the market.’” (quoting
BORK, supra note 2, at 269)). It is less clear how one would determine the relevant universe
of consumers if courts accept recent proposals to dispense with market definition in certain
merger cases. In some cases, however, the choice of such a relevant market will necessarily
be arbitrary. Consider, for instance, a merger between two firms that produce automobiles
for a national market. Assume further that the merger produces significant efficiencies that
manifest themselves as lower unit costs of producing the new firm’s product. Finally,
assume that the new firm cannot exercise market power in the national market but can, via
price discrimination, exercise such power in a narrow submarket. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE
& FTC, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 10 (2010) [hereinafter 2010 HORIZONTAL
MERGER GUIDELINES]. The transaction will reduce prices in one market (the overall national
market), while increasing prices in the price discrimination market(s) (unless the efficiencies
are extremely large). Thus, allowing the transaction will injure consumers in one (narrow)
market, while banning the transaction will injure consumes in the larger market. As far as
the author is aware, proponents of the “purchaser welfare” version of “consumer welfare”
have not offered a principle that would reveal which consumers the law should prefer in
these circumstances.
10. See, e.g., Robert H. Lande, The Rise and (Coming) Fall of Efficiency As the Ruler of
Antitrust, 33 ANTITRUST BULL. 429 (1988) (contending that purchaser welfare, and not
efficiency (total welfare), is the appropriate organizing principle of antitrust law).
11. BORK, supra note 2, at 107–12 (equating “consumer welfare” with the welfare of all
individuals in society, whether or not they are actual or potential purchasers in the market
affected by the challenged restraint); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Correspondence,
Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1696, 1702–03 (1986) [hereinafter Easterbrook,
Workable Antitrust Policy] (“Members of Congress did not see themselves choosing
between ‘efficiency’ and some other goal. . . . However you slice the legislative history, the
dominant theme is the protection of consumers from overcharges. This turns out to be the
same program as one based on ‘efficiency.’”); Frank H. Easterbrook, When Is It Worthwhile
To Use Courts To Search for Exclusionary Conduct, COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 345, 347 (2003)
[hereinafter Easterbrook, Exclusionary Conduct] (stating that concern for “consumers’
welfare” is a “shorthand for the allocative efficiency costs of monopoly” and endorsing this
approach). The assumption, of course, is that every individual is also a consumer, thereby
justifying the equation of the welfare of individuals with the welfare of “consumers.”
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from an exercise of market power to the detriment of purchasers in the
relevant market.12
As others have explained, this version of “consumer welfare” really just
seeks to maximize society’s total or aggregate welfare.13 This total welfare
approach implies that courts should ignore any purely distributional effects
of a challenged practice, given that pure redistribution is a zero-sum game
with no net impact on society’s economic welfare, and instead only ban
those practices that reduce the total value of society’s output by inducing a
less efficient allocation of resources than existed before the restraint.14 Put
more technically, this school of thought would have courts apply the
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency criterion to challenged practices, thereby banning
those practices—and only those practices—that result in a less efficient
allocation of the society’s given resources, and thus reduce society’s overall
stock of wealth, without regard to the distribution of such wealth.15
Many attribute this equation of “consumer welfare” with “total welfare”
to Robert Bork, who defined consumer welfare in this way during the
1960s.16 However, Bork was not the first to define consumer welfare in
this manner. Instead, more than a decade before Bork’s major work on the
subject, Arnold Harberger, an economist at the University of Chicago,
employed the term in this manner in his seminal work.17 In particular,
12. See BORK, supra note 2, at 110 (treating owners of a monopoly as consumers whose
welfare is part of the overall consumer welfare calculus); see also HOVENKAMP, supra note
2, at 85 (“[T]he consumer welfare principle [articulated by Bork and others] is predicated on
the observation that everyone is a consumer.” (emphasis in the original)).
13. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 85–86; Orbach, supra note 2, at 144; see also
Robert H. Bork, Antitrust and Monopoly: The Goals of Antitrust Policy, 57 AM. ECON. REV.
242, 245 (1967) (apparently equating “consumer welfare” with “national wealth”); Bork,
supra note 2, at 7 (courts should interpret the Sherman Act so as to maximize “consumer
welfare” or the “wealth or consumer want satisfaction”).
14. See BORK, supra note 2, at 110–12 (contending that courts should ignore
considerations of income distribution between consumers and producers when fashioning
antitrust doctrine); HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 85–86 (describing this total welfare
conception of “consumer welfare”); RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 9 (2d ed. 2001)
(stating that promotion of “[allocative] efficiency” is the only proper objective of the
antitrust laws); Easterbrook, Exclusionary Conduct, supra note 11, at 347 (stating that
concern for “consumers’ welfare” is “shorthand for the allocative efficiency costs of
monopoly”).
15. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 84 (equating this account of “consumer welfare”
with a “potential Pareto” optimality standard, which is a Kaldor-Hicks standard); see also
POSNER, supra note 14, at 2 (equating the “efficiency” relevant to antitrust laws with KaldorHicks efficiency); Guido Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation and Liability
Rules—A Comment, 11 J.L. & ECON. 67, 69–71 (1968) (arguing that antitrust regulation can
be explained as an effort to replicate allocation of resources that would occur in absence of
bargaining costs, thereby maximizing total welfare); Alan J. Meese, Debunking The
Purchaser Welfare Account of Section 2 of the Sherman Act: How Harvard Brought Us a
Total Welfare Standard and Why We Should Keep It, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 659, 701–02
(2010). It should be noted that Calabresi did not necessarily embrace this explanation as the
sole possible rationale for antitrust regulation. See Calabresi, supra, at 69–71.
16. See, e.g., Lande, supra note 2, at 83–84.
17. See Arnold C. Harberger, Monopoly and Resource Allocation, 44 AM. ECON. REV.
77 (1954).
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Harberger set out to determine the overall impact of monopoly (both
unilateral and shared) on resource allocation and resulting total economic
welfare. The resulting 1954 article employed the term “consumer welfare”
seven times, each time in a manner that clearly equates the term with total
welfare.18 While Bork never cited this or any other work by Harberger, he
employed the same definition of “consumer welfare.”
Several other proponents have endorsed such a “total welfare” standard
in the antitrust context without attempting to equate such welfare with
“consumer welfare.”19 Under such a “total welfare” approach, proof that a
challenged practice exercises market power, distorts the allocation of
resources, and injures consumers in a relevant market is only a necessary
18. See, e.g., id. at 84 (“Elimination of resource misallocations in American
manufacturing in the late twenties would bring with it an improvement in consumer welfare
of just a little more than a tenth of a per cent. In present values, this welfare gain would
amount to about $2.00 per capita.”); id. (characterizing this same loss as a “total welfare
loss”); id. at 78 fig.1 (displaying the so-called “welfare loss triangle”); id. (stating that
column 4 “measures the amount by which consumer ‘welfare’ fell short of the level it would
have attained if resources had been so allocated as to give each industry an equal return on
capital. It assumes that the elasticity of demand for the products of each industry is unity
and approximates the area designated as the ‘welfare loss’ in Figure 1.”).
19. See CARL KAYSEN & DONALD TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY: AN ECONOMIC AND
LEGAL ANALYSIS (1959) (contending that antitrust law should adopt a “Pigouvian” approach
that bans all practices that enhance market power without producing significant efficiencies);
POSNER, supra note 14, at 9 (stating that promotion of “[allocative] efficiency” is the only
proper objective of the antitrust laws); J.M. Clark, Toward a Concept of Workable
Competition, 30 AM. ECON. REV. 241 (1940); Ken Heyer, Welfare Standards and Merger
Analysis: Why Not the Best?, 2 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 29 (2006) (describing the
difference between a “total welfare” and a so-called “consumer welfare” test as applied to
mergers and advocating the adoption of the former); Edward S. Mason, Monopoly in Law
and Economics, 47 YALE L.J. 34 (1938); Donald F. Turner, The Scope of Antitrust and Other
Economic Regulatory Policies, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1207, 1208–09 (1969) (assuming the
appropriate goal of economic policy is to “maximize aggregate economic wealth” and
endorsing the view that economies of scale should justify high concentration); Oliver E.
Williamson, Allocative Efficiency and the Limits of Antitrust, 59 AM. ECON. REV. 105, 108–
09 (1969) (advocating the “allocative efficiency” approach on the grounds that such an
approach will maximize society’s total welfare); see also United States v. Microsoft Corp.,
253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc) (per curiam) (antitrust should seek to maximize
social welfare); Meese, supra note 15, at 668–69 (describing the contending definitions of
“consumer welfare” and contending that Bork’s version is properly dubbed a “total welfare”
standard); id. at 690–715 (contending that section 2 case law exemplifies a “total welfare”
approach and that courts should retain such a standard). Several other scholars have, over
the years, embraced a “total welfare” approach when tackling antitrust problems, without
recognizing the existence of an alternative standard. It should be noted here that those who
equate allocative improvements with improvements in total welfare necessarily assume that
the marginal value of an additional dollar of wealth is equal across all members of society, or
at least all those impacted by challenged conduct. See Williamson, supra, at 108
(“Necessarily, for every allocative efficiency judgment which has distributional
consequences, there exists an implicit, if not an explicit, distributional weighting. Typically
the benefits and costs are weighted equally, ‘to whomsoever they may accrue.’”); see also
POSNER, supra note 14, at 23 (stating that the equation of allocative efficiency with total
welfare rests upon the heroic “assumption that a dollar is worth the same to [everybody],” an
assumption that allows for the equation of wealth maximization via allocative efficiency
with utility and this welfare maximization).
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attribute of antitrust harm, given that some practices that result in such
misallocation and injury to market consumers might also create productive
efficiencies. The creation of such efficiencies is itself an improvement in
the allocation of resources—an improvement that might exceed the
allocative harm resulting from an exercise of market power.20 Given this
possibility, the total welfare standard will only condemn those practices that
reduce overall efficiency, that is, result in an allocation of resources that, on
net, diverts resources to lowered-valued uses and thus reduces wealth and
economic welfare.21 Consequently, unlike a purchaser welfare approach,
the total welfare version of consumer welfare takes into account the wellbeing of all members of society, including producers in the relevant market.
The choice between these two definitions of “consumer welfare” is not
always dispositive when analyzing challenged restraints. After all, much
conduct potentially subject to antitrust regulation—even conduct that
eliminates rivalry between competitors—has no apparent impact on
consumer welfare, however defined, or may even improve such welfare
under either definition. For instance, when two former rivals form a
partnership, they reduce competition between themselves. However, unless
the reduction in rivalry confers market power on the parties, the reduction
can neither raise prices nor cause a misallocation of resources and thus
cannot reduce “consumer welfare” under either definition.22 In the same
way, a merger or joint venture between two independent firms will certainly
reduce rivalry but may not confer market power. Indeed, like the formation
of a partnership, a merger or joint venture may result in productive
efficiencies and thus enhance the allocation of resources, increase market
output, and reduce prices, thereby increasing consumer welfare under either
definition.23
20. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 2, at 110–12. It should be noted that Williamson
obscured this point by his choice of terminology. See Oliver E. Williamson, Economies As
an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs, 59 AMER. ECON. REV. 18, 22 n.4 (1968) (“My
use of dead-weight loss is somewhat restrictive. Inefficiency is also a dead-weight loss. For
convenience of exposition, however, I refer to the Marshallian triangle as the dead-weight
loss and compare this to the cost saving (efficiency) aspects of a merger.”). In other
contexts, economists regularly treat productive inefficiency as a misallocation of resources
producing a deadweight loss. See infra notes 153–54, 218–21 and accompanying text.
21. See BORK, supra note 2, at 107–10; Williamson, supra note 19, at 107 (“The
allocative efficiency consequences of any merger that increases both efficiency and market
power can be evaluated only by estimating net effects.”); see also POSNER, supra note 14, at
9 (articulating the view that “the economic theory of monopoly provides the only sound
basis for antitrust policy”); id. at 27 (concluding that the “[total welfare] approach emerges
as the natural, the feasible, and the legitimate guide to interpreting the antitrust statutes”).
22. See Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and
Market Division, 75 YALE L.J. 373 (1966); see also Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad.
Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 9 (1979) (“When two partners set the price of their goods or services, they
are literally ‘price fixing,’ but they are not per se in violation of the Sherman Act.”).
23. See generally, e.g., United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir.
1898) (explaining how the common law encouraged the formation of partnerships and
accompanying agreements even though the result was reduced competition between the
partners); see also Broad. Music, Inc., 441 U.S. at 23 (“Mergers among competitors
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On the other hand, some conduct reduces consumer welfare under either
definition. Naked horizontal price fixing, for instance, can exercise market
power, increase consumer prices, and distort the allocation of resources,
thereby reducing both total welfare and consumer surplus and thus the
welfare of purchasers in the relevant market.24 Not surprisingly, then,
proponents of both schools of thought condemn such conduct.25 In the
same way, a merger can enhance market concentration and thereby
facilitate the unilateral or concerted exercise of market power, reducing the
welfare of purchasers in the relevant market and distorting the allocation of
resources. Here again, and not surprisingly, both schools of thought
condemn such transactions.26 Finally, conduct can exclude rivals on a basis
other than efficiency and raise prices and distort the allocation of resources,
here again reducing both total and purchaser welfare and eliciting the
condemnation of both camps.27
Not all conduct potentially subject to antitrust regulation is as
unambiguously harmful or beneficial as the categories of conduct described
above. Instead, some conduct enhances producers’ market power while

eliminate competition, including price competition, but they are not per se illegal, and many
of them withstand attack under any existing antitrust standard.”); BORK, supra note 2, at 221
(contending that the vast majority of mergers should be lawful because they lead to no
market power and thus no allocative loss).
24. See BORK, supra note 2, at 263 (stating that the per se ban on price fixing has
resulted in “contributions to consumer welfare over the decades [that] have been
enormous”). To be sure, price fixing by small market participants my produce no harm
whatsoever, at least in theory. However, as the Supreme Court has explained, the fact that
cartel participants expend resources creating, enforcing, and defending a price fixing
agreement thereby signals members’ belief that they constitute a ‘relevant market” for
antitrust purposes and thus have the power to exercise market power and impose harm. See
FTC v. Super. Ct. Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 435 n.18 (1990) (“‘Very few firms
that lack power to affect market prices will be sufficiently foolish to enter into conspiracies
to fix prices. Thus, the fact of agreement defines the market.’” (quoting BORK, supra note 2,
at 269)).
25. See BORK, supra note 2, at 267–69 (contending that cartel pricing should be unlawful
per se); Robert H. Lande & Howard P. Marvel, Three Types of Collusion: Fixing Prices,
Rivals, and Rules, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 941, 944–46 (same).
26. See generally BORK, supra note 2, at 220–22 (condemning mergers that lead to high
enough market concentration to confer market power and thus produce allocative losses);
Alan A. Fisher & Robert H. Lande, Efficiency Considerations in Merger Enforcement,
71 CALIF. L. REV. 1580 (1983); Williamson, supra note 19, at 106–09 (advocating so-called
“allocative efficiency criterion” that would ban any transaction that results in a net allocative
loss, including mergers that raise prices without producing efficiencies). Of course, Bork
opined that courts should not engage in a case-by-case comparison of the allocative losses
resulting from market power with the allocative gains resulting from productive efficiencies.
See BORK, supra note 2, at 122–29. He did so because he believed that such balancing was
beyond the capacity of the courts and not because he believed that such efficiencies were
irrelevant as a normative matter.
27. See BORK, supra note 2, at 160 (approving a ban on “improper exclusion,” that is,
conduct that excludes rivals on some basis other than efficiency and thus protects monopoly
without offsetting benefits); Salop, supra note 2, at 317 (approving a ban on conduct that
excludes rivals without producing any benefits).
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simultaneously creating significant productive efficiencies.28 Where such
“mixed” or “ambiguous” conduct is concerned, the choice between “total
welfare” and “purchaser welfare” standards and their respective accounts of
antitrust harm will usually (but not always) be dispositive. Thus, the choice
between a “purchaser welfare” and “total welfare” definition of “consumer
welfare” can have significant consequences for antitrust doctrine.29
Take merger law. While most mergers are either unambiguously
harmful, beneficial, or benign, some are a “mixed bag,” enhancing market
power and creating productive efficiencies.30 Under a “purchaser welfare
approach,” a merger that both enhances the market power of the newly
created firm while simultaneously creating efficiencies is invalid, except in
those rare cases in which the transaction creates efficiencies so large that
they compel the new firm to “pass on” such efficiencies to purchasers in the
relevant market, by charging prices lower than or equal to those charged
before the transaction and thereby protecting purchasers in the relevant
market from overcharges.31 Thus, it is said, courts and agencies should
ignore those efficiencies that only manifest themselves as profits for
shareholders of the merging parties and thus increase producer surplus even
if those efficiencies produce allocative gains that outweigh the harm
resulting from the market-power induced misallocation of resources and
result in an increase in total welfare.32
By contrast, under a total welfare approach, price is beside the point
when analyzing such a transaction; a merger that creates market power and
results in higher prices will nonetheless survive scrutiny whenever it creates
productive, and thus allocative, efficiencies that outweigh the relatively
small deadweight loss resulting from the misallocation of resources
associated with market power.33 Such a transaction should survive
scrutiny, it is said, even if the shareholders of the merging firms capture all
28. See Williamson, supra note 19, at 106–07 (describing so-called “mixed cases”
whereby challenged conduct both enhances market power and results in productive
efficiency—both impacts which have offsetting allocative consequences).
29. But see Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, supra note 11, at 1703 (“There are
differences at the margins [between a policy based on ‘purchaser welfare’ and one based on
‘total welfare’] such as what if anything to do about price discrimination . . . but the
differences are not very important.”).
30. See Williamson, supra note 19, at 106–07.
31. Fisher & Lande, supra note 26, at 1589 (contending that section 7 of the Clayton Act
forbids any merger that results in higher prices, without regard to the overall impact upon
total welfare); id. at 1592 (“In short, Congress’ primary concern was to prevent the
formation of market power that would unfairly transfer wealth from consumers to
monopolists; efficiency was only of small concern. Congress’ goal was competitive pricing,
which it defined primarily in distributive rather than in efficiency terms.”).
32. See id. at 1632–33 (contending that the courts should treat “wealth transfer effects”
and the resulting increase in producer surplus as consumer harm when evaluating a merger
that creates both efficiencies and market power).
33. See BORK, supra note 2, at 107–10 (employing this example to illustrate implications
of the total welfare approach); Williamson, supra note 19, at 108 (“The emphasis throughout
is on mergers, but much of the argument generalizes easily.”).
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of the welfare gains attributable to the transaction, because it results in a net
improvement in the allocation of society’s resources and thus improves
society’s total economic welfare.34 Indeed, more than four decades ago,
Oliver Williamson, applying a “naïve” partial equilibrium trade-off model,
demonstrated that a reduction in production costs of 2 percent would almost
always produce efficiencies that offset the reduction in welfare resulting
from a misallocation of resources caused by enhanced market power.35
The choice between competing welfare standards can have similar
consequences in other contexts where transactions simultaneously produce
market power and productive efficiencies and thus have offsetting
allocative effects. For instance, section 1’s Rule of Reason requires courts
to “weigh” or “balance” a restraint’s harms against any benefits it produces
to determine the restraint’s overall impact on consumer welfare.36 The
exact nature of such balancing will, not surprisingly, depend upon the
tribunal’s choice between a “purchaser welfare” and a “total welfare”
standard.37 Under a purchaser welfare standard, courts will focus on the
impact of the challenged restraint on price in the relevant market, asking
whether the benefits of the restraint offset the negative impact on
consumers resulting from any exercise of market power.38 Under a total
welfare standard, by contrast, courts will balance the quantum of
efficiencies produced by the restraint against the harm resulting from the
misallocation of resources caused by any market power.39 As a result, and
as with mergers, application of a total welfare standard will leave unscathed
numerous restraints that a purchaser welfare standard would condemn.40
Moreover, courts applying section 2’s ban on “monopolization” must
evaluate conduct that either led to or preserved a monopoly and, thus,
perhaps resulted in prices higher than would have occurred without such

34. See Williamson, supra note 19, at 106–09.
35. See Williamson, supra note 20, at 21–23.
36. See Alan J. Meese, Price Theory, Competition and the Rule of Reason, 2003 U. ILL.
L. REV. 77, 98–99. For a classic statement, see Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1019 (10th
Cir. 1998) (“[T]he harms and benefits must be weighed against each other in order to judge
whether the challenged behavior is, on balance, reasonable.” (citing PHILLIP E. AREEDA,
ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1502 (1986))).
37. See Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol, The Rule of Reason and the Goals of
Antitrust: An Economic Approach, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 471 (2012).
38. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1985) (condemning
a challenged restraint despite the claim that it produced efficiencies given the trial court’s
findings that the restraint resulted in higher prices and reduced output in the relevant
market).
39. See generally Blair & Sokol, supra note 37; see also Frank H. Easterbrook, The
Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 15–16 (1984) (resting an argument for relatively
permissive antitrust rules on the unelaborated assumption that the misallocation of resources
is the only harm from monopoly pricing and that false positives deter cost-reducing conduct
and increase the cost of producing the market’s entire output).
40. But see Michael A. Carrier, The Rule of Reason: An Empirical Update for the 21st
Century, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 827, 827 (2009) (finding that over 95 percent of Rule of
Reason cases fail for lack of proof of harm under either standard).
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conduct.41 Some such conduct simply excludes rivals and creates or
preserves monopoly without producing any offsetting virtues and is thus
subject to condemnation under any standard.42 Other conduct, however,
both excludes rivals and produces nontrivial benefits. The classic example,
akin to the efficiency-creating merger, entails the expansion of output and
realization of efficiencies, a form of “competition on the merits” that allows
a putative monopolist to underprice smaller firms, thereby driving rivals
from the market and deterring entry by others.43 After taking over the
market, the firm could raise prices above the preexisting level, while
continuing to realize efficiencies whose positive impact outweighs any
allocative losses.44 Here again, the choice between competing definitions
of “consumer welfare” will determine whether courts and agencies
condemn such conduct.45
Finally, separate and apart from any impact on substantive doctrine, the
choice between these two definitions of consumer welfare will have
important implications for public and private enforcement, particularly
when viewed through the lens of the optimal deterrence model.46 This
model posits an inverse relationship between investments in various forms
of law enforcement (e.g., detection, prosecution, and sanctions), on the one
hand, and the activity producing social harm (e.g., cartels), on the other.
Such “investments,” of course, include the cost of so-called “false
positives,” that is, the (forgone) benefits of conduct that an imperfect

41. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 480–81
(1992) (noting that a successful monopolization claim requires proof that monopolist used
monopoly power to acquire or maintain the monopoly); United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384
U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966) (same).
42. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
43. See Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 482–83 (explaining how maintenance of monopoly
by means of efficiency is lawful per se); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 110 F.
Supp. 295, 345 (D. Mass. 1953), aff’d, 347 U.S. 521 (1954) (competition “based on pure
merit,” including realization of efficiencies, is unlawful per se); see also Meese, supra note
15, at 690–715 (explaining how “competition on the merits” has been lawful per se since the
1950s).
44. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 29–31 (describing a natural monopoly achieved
because of economies of scale); see also DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF,
MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 151–52 (2d ed. 1994) (same); id. at 139–41 (discussing
other possible efficiency sources of monopoly).
45. Compare Meese, supra note 15, at 671–72 (explaining how the application of a total
welfare standard will validate such conduct, without regard to the resulting price), with
Edlin, supra note 8 (contending that courts should adopt rules governing predatory pricing
that encourage entry of inefficient rivals when necessary to reduce purchaser prices). See
also CARL KAYSEN, UNITED STATES V. UNITED SHOE MACHINERY: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
OF AN ANTITRUST CASE 16–19 (1956) (arguing that monopoly maintained by means of
economies of scale is unobjectionable); KAYNES & TURNER, supra note 19, at 22, 268; Oliver
E. Williamson, Dominant Firms and the Monopoly Problem:
Market Failure
Considerations, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1512 (1972).
46. See generally Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,
76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968); William M. Landes, Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations,
50 U. CHI. L. REV. 652 (1983) (applying Becker’s model in the antitrust context).
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enforcement regime will ban.47 The model also posits that investments in
enforcement are characterized by diminishing returns. Thus, while each
incremental dollar spent on law enforcement will further reduce the targeted
social harm, such reductions may at some point be so small that additional
investments in law enforcement will reduce overall welfare. If this is the
case, then a wealth-maximizing society will tolerate a certain amount of
harm-creating conduct.48 As a result, the optimal deterrence model implies
that society should invest resources in law enforcement until the last dollar
invested reduces the targeted harm by the same amount. Such a strategy
will thus minimize the overall social cost of the activity in question, defined
as the sum of enforcement costs plus the cost of any remaining social
harm.49 If so, then wealth maximization requires that mix and level of
investments that minimize the sum of such investments and resulting social
harm.
Of course, application of this model requires courts and agencies to
identify the relevant “social harm” that investments in law enforcement are
supposed to reduce. Obviously, different definitions of “consumer welfare”
imply different definitions of “social harm” relevant to this calculus. Under
the “total welfare” view, the only relevant harm is any net reduction in total
welfare resulting from an overall inefficient allocation of resources.50
Under this view, even a naked cartel might produce relatively modest actual
harm.51 Under the “purchaser welfare” view, by contrast, any reduction in
consumer surplus in the relevant market constitutes harm, even if the
transaction actually increases total welfare.52 As a result, the “payoffs”
from particular investments in enforcement of the antitrust laws will vary
significantly between the two regimes, even with respect to those restraints,
like naked cartels, that both schools of thought would condemn, as will the
optimal structure of enforcement institutions and penalties.53 Roughly
47. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Allocating Antitrust Decisionmaking Tasks, 76 GEO. L.J.
305, 307–09 (1987).
48. See Landes, supra note 46, at 652–53 (“[Becker] showed that when the costs of
enforcement are positive, it is generally not optimal to reduce the number of violations to
zero.”).
49. See id.
50. See id. at 653 (adopting the total welfare standard when applying an optimal
deterrence model to determine antitrust sanctions); Easterbrook, supra note 39, at 15–16
(treating the misallocation of resources as the only pertinent harm when deriving optimal
antitrust rules).
51. Cf. Harberger, supra note 17, at 84 (finding that the total reduction in GNP resulting
from monopolistic misallocations amounted to about $2.00 per consumer).
52. See supra notes 9–11 and accompanying text.
53. Of course, any assessment of the relevant “costs” of enforcement would have to
include the costs of “false positives,” that is, instances in which courts condemn a restraint,
transaction, or practice that in fact produces benefits. As I have explained elsewhere, what
counts as a “false positive” will depend significantly upon the definition of “harm” that
courts posit. See Meese, supra note 15, at 661–62. Thus, to the extent that different
institutional arrangements—private enforcement in Article III courts, public enforcement in
Article III Courts, and/or administrative enforcement before the Federal Trade
Commission—result in different sorts of errors, the choice between two definitions of
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speaking, it seems clear that a “purchaser welfare” conception of antitrust
harm will warrant more robust investments in enforcing the various
antitrust laws than a total welfare approach.54 For one thing, the latter
approach would leave completely unscathed some practices that the
purchaser welfare standard would condemn. Moreover, while both
standards would condemn a naked cartel, for instance, the purchaser welfare
standard would attribute far more harm to such price fixing than a total
welfare approach.55 As a result, investments in law enforcement that might
pay off handsomely under a purchaser welfare standard may actually reduce
welfare under a total welfare standard.
It bears repeating that a preference for a purchaser welfare standard over
a total welfare standard will destroy wealth as economists and others
conventionally define it.56 Indeed, in some cases, application of the
purchaser welfare standard will eliminate wealth that exceeds preserved
consumer surplus several times over. Assume, for instance, that a merger to
monopoly produces both market power and large efficiencies. Assume
further that the efficiencies are so large, perhaps a 25 percent cost reduction,
that they would almost (but not quite) prevent the new firm from pricing
above the premerger level (e.g., that a postmerger price increase would not
exceed 5 percent).57 While banning such a transaction would preserve the
value of premerger consumer surplus, by preventing a modest price
increase, it would do so only by preventing the realization of efficiencies
consumer welfare may influence the appropriate mix and jurisdiction of institutions chosen
to enforce the antitrust laws.
54. Indeed, application of the optimal deterrence model may suggest that the “purchaser
welfare standard” proves too much and thus cannot be applied consistently and to its logical
conclusion. After all, given its hostility toward efficiency “as such,” the purchaser welfare
standard would require any additional investment (e.g., large public expenditures, many false
positives, and reduced efficiencies), so long as the incremental investment would slightly
improve purchaser welfare. But cf. Baker, supra note 8 (contending that antitrust law should
ban all practices that injure consumers in the relevant market unless doing so would sacrifice
very large efficiencies in a particular case).
55. See, e.g., Williamson, supra note 20, at 21 (graphically demonstrating both
deadweight efficiency loss and significantly larger transfer of income from purchasers to
producers resulting from merger-created market power).
56. See Fisher & Lande, supra note 26, at 1631 (noting that most economists employ a
“total welfare” metric for measuring the impact of transactions that create both market power
and efficiencies). See also generally Richard A. Posner, Wealth Maximization Revisited,
2 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 85 (1985).
57. See Alan A. Fisher, Robert H. Lande & Walter Vandaele, Afterword: Could a
Merger Lead to Both Monopoly and a Lower Price, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1697 (1983) (finding
that merger to monopoly will often lead to higher prices despite large efficiencies); id. at
1702 (“A merger would have to produce extraordinarily large cost savings to permit the
same or lower prices from monopoly than from a premerger competitive situation.”); id.
(concluding that, where the elasticity of demand in the premerger market was four, cost
reduction of 25 percent would be necessary to counteract the resulting exercise of monopoly
power, while an even larger cost reduction would be necessary if elasticity were smaller);
see also F.M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 22 (3d ed. 1990) (illustrating how a very efficient monopoly could charge
profit-maximizing prices below what would prevail in a competitive market).
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that exceed this preserved surplus by almost a factor of five.58 Such
considerations may explain why some scholars, otherwise sympathetic to
the purchaser welfare approach, contend that courts should recognize an
exception for those instances in which a challenged practice or transaction
produces efficiencies that greatly outweigh the reduction in consumer
surplus.59 They may also explain why some contend that a total welfare
approach will actually enhance the welfare of purchasers in the long run.60
The choice between “total welfare” and “purchaser welfare” as the
governing standard is a normative one, and there are various possible ways
to answer this normative question. The chief proponents of the “purchaser
welfare” and “total welfare” schools of thought have taken a legal approach
to discerning the appropriate normative standard in this context, with each
claiming that its preferred approach is consistent with the original meaning
of the Sherman Act.61 Both also derive that meaning by means of the now
out-of-fashion method of scrutinizing the legislative history of the Act to
determine its authors’ “original intent,” which, each camp claims, supports
its preferred interpretation.62 In particular, the “total welfare” camp
58. “Almost” a factor of five because banning the transaction would also protect those
marginal consumers who would suffer a loss in surplus as a result of the output reduction
that would have resulted from the merger. See generally Williamson, supra note 20, at 21–
23.
59. See Baker, supra note 8 (contending that antitrust law should ban all practices that
injure consumers in the relevant market unless doing so would sacrifice very large
efficiencies in a particular case).
60. See Easterbrook, supra note 11, at 1703 (“In the long run consumers gain the most
from a policy that emphasizes allocative and productive efficiency.”). See also HOVENKAMP,
supra note 2, at 86 (“most efficiencies have a way of trickling through the economy so that
they benefit everyone.”).
61. Some take a different approach. For instance, eschewing conventional legal
analysis, Professor Baker has sought to determine which approach would obtain and enjoy
stable political support by consumers and producers. See Baker, supra note 8. Moreover,
Richard Posner concedes that the legislative history contains many references to the “noneconomic” approach (in which he includes the distributional, purchaser welfare approach as
well as concerns for small business and the like). See POSNER, supra note 14, at 26–27.
However, he also contends that the statutory language invites (but does not compel), a total
welfare approach and that any other approach would be unworkable. See id. Indeed, Bork
himself contended that departure from a “total welfare” approach would require courts to
make value choices and trade-offs that are beyond the legitimate authority of courts, absent
an express delegation from Congress. See Robert H. Bork, Antitrust and Monopoly: The
Goals of Antitrust Policy, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 242 (1967). While both men may be correct
that an antitrust policy based upon a concern for the autonomy of small business as one or
several values is unworkable, neither explains why a policy based upon “purchaser welfare,”
a single, clear objective, would be unworkable. Judge Bork’s failure to address this
objection is understandable, however, insofar as his writings on the topic predated Professor
Lande’s contention, based on a detailed examination of the legislative history, that Congress
meant to ban all restraints that reduce consumer surplus, without regard to overall efficiency
consequences. See, e.g., Lande, supra note 2, passim.
62. That is, both camps engage in what one might properly call “first generation
originalism,” which sought to discern the “original intent” of those who drafted the text in
question by consulting legislative history and other evidence of such subjective meaning. As
others have explained, modern originalism has jettisoned this search for subjective intent,
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invokes evidence that Senator Sherman and others wanted to ban
combinations that reduced output and increased consumer prices without
interfering with combinations or other practices that generated productive
efficiencies, even if such efficiencies hampered rivals.63 By contrast, the
“purchaser welfare” camp contends that Congress could not have
understood that the exercise of market power results in a deadweight loss,
and thus allocative (in)efficiency, with the result that Congress must have
had in mind some other sort of “harm” that justified regulation.64 As a
result, this camp focuses on statements suggesting that members of
Congress believed that consumers were “entitled” to prices set by a
competitive market, and that practices that increased prices above the
competitive level abridged this entitlement.65 These proponents concede, as
they must, that Senator Sherman and others recognized that combinations
between rivals could create significant productive efficiencies.66 At the
changing the focus to the “original public meaning” of the text under consideration. See
KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1999); Randy E. Barnett,
Scalia’s Infidelity: A Critique of “Fainthearted Originalism,” 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 7, 9 (2006)
(describing the shift, during the 1990s, from originalism focused on “subjective intent” of
the drafters to an effort to ascertain the “original public meaning” of a document); see also,
e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION (1997). To his credit, Professor
Lande has, in an article prepared for this conference, essayed to offer a textualist argument in
support of his preferred “purchaser welfare” interpretation of the Sherman Act. Robert H.
Lande, A Traditional and Textualist Analysis of the Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency,
Preventing Theft from Consumers, and Consumer Choice, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2349
(2013).
63. See Bork, supra note 2, at 14–21 (discussing various policy statements in the
legislative history of the Sherman Act); id. at 26–31 (discussing the consequences of
proposed rules of law for possible interpretations of the Act). Thus Bork, for instance,
emphasizes that members of Congress contemplated an across-the-board ban on price fixing,
without regard to distributional consequences. See id. at 21–25.
64. See Lande, supra note 2, at 88 (“It is extremely unlikely that the legislators’ distaste
for monopoly pricing could have been based upon its impact on allocative efficiency: the
concept of allocative efficiency was, at best, on the verge of discovery by leading economic
theorists when the Sherman Act was passed.”); see also Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust’s
Protected Classes, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1, 21 n.55 (1989); Louis Kaplow, Antitrust, Law &
Economics, and the Courts, 50 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 181, 207–08 (1987) (“[I]t is virtually
impossible that the Sherman Act could have been crafted with only economic efficiency in
mind. . . . . [T]he most straight-forward efficiency argument against cartels and monopoly—
the one the Chicago or [total welfare] school has in mind—refers not to efficiency in
production but rather to allocative efficiency, which designates the welfare loss due to the
misallocation of resources resulting from purchase decisions that are based upon supercompetitive prices. Yet, at the time of the Sherman Act’s passage, this aspect of efficiency
was making only its first appearance in economics literature, and it was not until decades
later that economists generally came to understand and apply the concept.”). But cf. Meese,
supra note 36, at 86 n.42 (quoting Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations for the proposition
that monopolies “derange . . . natural distribution in the stock of the society” and that “every
derangement of the natural distribution of stock is necessarily hurtful to the society in which
it takes place”); E.G. West, The Burdens of Monopoly: Classical Versus Neoclassical,
44 S. ECON. J. 829, 836–37 (1978) (arguing that Adam Smith understood allocative
inefficiency as one burden of monopoly).
65. See, e.g., Lande, supra note 2, at 93–96.
66. See id. at 90–91.

2013]

THE (FALSE?) CHOICE

2215

same time, these proponents emphasize statements by Senator Sherman and
others that combinations “pocket” such efficiencies instead of passing them
along to consumers, thus increasing their profits at the expense of
purchasers.67 Thus, it is said, Sherman and others meant to ban
combinations that resulted in higher purchaser prices, without regard to
whether such combinations produced efficiencies, the allocative effects of
which outweighed any deadweight losses.68 Therefore, these proponents
say, Sherman and others rejected any suggestion that significant efficiencies
could validate a transaction that resulted in higher prices for purchasers in
the relevant market. These same proponents have reached similar
conclusions about the legislative history of section 7 of the Clayton Act.69
Most of the dispute over the appropriate definition of “consumer welfare”
has taken place within the academy, with scholars in the respective camps
staking out and supporting clear positions. By contrast, judges have
declined to embrace either approach wholesale. For instance, courts
implementing section 2 of the Sherman Act have, for six decades, embraced
a total welfare approach, albeit implicitly.70 That is, courts, including the
Supreme Court, have repeatedly held that so-called “competition on the
merits” is lawful per se, without regard to whether such conduct results in
higher prices and thus reduces consumers’ surplus.71 The classic example
of such “competition on the merits,” of course, is the realization of
economies of scale or other productive efficiencies that allow a firm to
underprice its less-efficient rivals, exclude them from the market, and thus
maintain monopoly and associated prices.72 Such conduct, courts have
67. See id. (“But congressional endorsement of trusts’ efficient operations stopped when
consumer prices rose, and the legislature withheld approval from combinations that, while
yielding more efficient methods of competition, also produced higher consumer prices. The
trusts were condemned despite their efficiency in large part because they kept the fruits of
such efficiency. As Senator Sherman pointed out in qualification of his praise for efficiency,
‘[i]t is sometimes said of these combinations that they reduce prices to the consumer by
better methods of production, but all experience shows that this saving of cost goes to the
pockets of the producer.’ Congressional condemnation of monopolistic extractions of wealth
was so strong that it is even unlikely that Congress meant to provide an exception for a
monopoly based solely upon superior efficiency.”).
68. See id. at 91–92.
69. See Fisher & Lande, supra note 26, at 1588–93 (reviewing section 7’s legislative
history and concluding that Congress meant to ban any transaction that resulted in higher
prices without regard to efficiency impact). But cf. Timothy J. Muris, The Efficiency Defense
Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 30 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 381, 393–402 (1980)
(reviewing legislative history and concluding that Congress anticipated that the realization of
productive efficiencies would militate in favor of a merger).
70. See Meese, supra note 15.
71. See id. at 692–703, 708–15; (collecting and discussing numerous authorities); see
also, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 481–83 (1992)
(conduct supported by “valid business reasons” cannot violate section 2); United States v.
United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 343 (D. Mass. 1953), aff’d, 347 U.S. 521
(1954) (per curiam).
72. See, e.g., Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related
Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697, 705–06 (1975)
(explaining how so-called “limit pricing” by a firm operating at a more efficient scale than
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said, is lawful per se, even if it helps a monopolist protect its dominant
position.73 As many have recognized, this rule implements and reflects a
“total welfare” goal for antitrust.74
By contrast, case law implementing section 1 of the Sherman Act is more
ambiguous.75 On the one hand, the Supreme Court has, in a section 1 case,
quoted Robert Bork’s The Antitrust Paradox for the proposition that
Congress embraced “consumer welfare” as the exclusive goal of antitrust,
thereby embracing, it seems, a “total welfare” standard.76 In other contexts,
however, the Court has articulated doctrine in a way that seems to reflect a
“purchaser welfare” standard. As noted earlier, both the “purchaser
welfare” and “total welfare” standards condemn naked horizontal price
fixing as unlawful per se.77 Most conduct, however, is analyzed under
section 1’s “Rule of Reason,” under which courts “weigh” or “balance” a
restraint’s anticompetitive harms against any procompetitive virtues.78
Within this context, the Supreme Court at least has implied that, for
purposes of section 1 analysis, proof that a restraint results in prices higher
than the status quo ante dooms any claim that efficiencies exceed harms.79
Such a result, with its dispositive focus on price, can only make sense, if at

possible entrants can exclude the latter from the market and thus maintain monopoly). But cf.
Edlin, supra note 8, at 144 (explaining how courts applying a purchaser welfare standard
would ban such a practice).
73. Brooke Grp., Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 223 (1993)
(holding that section 2 does not forbid aggressive above-cost pricing that preserves a
monopolist’s dominant position); Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263,
274 (2d Cir. 1979) (“A firm that has lawfully acquired a monopoly position is not barred
from taking advantage of scale economies by constructing, for example, a large and efficient
factory. These benefits are a consequence of size and not an exercise of power over the
market.”).
74. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHI. L.
REV. 263, 297–304 (1981) (rejecting liability based upon above-cost “limit pricing” because
such a standard would encourage entry by less efficient rivals and thus deprive society of
benefits that would exceed gains from reducing market power); Meese, supra note 15, at
671–72; Turner, supra note 19, at 1208–09 (endorsing the total welfare standard to govern
antitrust regulation); id. at 1220–21 (advocating ban on persistent monopolies unless
resulting from economies of scale, regardless of prices).
75. See generally Blair & Sokol, supra note 37 (concluding that section 1 case law is
ambiguous on this point).
76. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (“Congress designed the
Sherman Act as a ‘consumer welfare prescription.’” (quoting ROBERT H. BORK, THE
ANTITRUST PARADOX 66 (1978))). To be sure, in 1979, Professor Lande had not yet
articulated his competing definition of “consumer welfare.” However, there was no doubt at
the time that Bork and other members of the Chicago school equated “consumer welfare”
with total welfare.
77. See supra notes 24–25 and accompanying text.
78. See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text.
79. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 114 (1984) (holding
that benefits purportedly produced by a restraint did not counterbalance the harms for
purposes of section 1 rule-of-reason analysis given the factual finding that restraint resulted
in prices higher than they otherwise would have been.).
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all, under a purchaser welfare standard.80 Indeed, the Court has even
opined that an asserted benefit is not cognizable in the first place if the
assertion depends upon the assumption that the challenged restraint will
result in prices that are higher than the status quo ante.81 At the same time,
in the very same decision announcing this “rule,” the Court held that
agreements limiting price and output on their face survive per se
condemnation because, in some instances, unbridled competition might
interfere with a well-functioning market and thus hamper interbrand
competition.82 In short, section 1 jurisprudence leans toward a purchaser
welfare approach, in contrast to section 2’s clear total welfare approach.
It may seem surprising that courts have not yet settled upon a definitive
choice between “purchaser welfare” and total welfare in the section 1
context. At the same time, this choice is rarely, if ever, outcome
determinative, at least in litigated cases. For instance, the vast majority of
section 1 cases—over 96 percent—fail because the plaintiffs cannot
establish a prima facie case that the challenged restraint produces prices
above the prerestraint level or that output is below it.83 Such proof, of
course, is a necessary condition for establishing antitrust harm under either
normative standard.84 Moreover, courts “balance” harms against benefits in
just over 2 percent of the cases, and the defendant prevailed in nearly all
such cases (four out of five).85 Moreover, it does not appear that the results
in these cases turned, at least consciously, on a choice of competing
standards. Indeed, in several such cases, courts did not mention “price” at
all, choosing instead to focus on the purported magnitude of benefits
without linking those benefits to purchaser welfare.86 Put another way,
80. It should be noted that price cannot always be dispositive in the section 1 context.
For instance, some intrabrand restraints, whether horizontal or vertical, survive per se
condemnation because they can help overcome failures in the distribution market, thereby
inducing dealers to invest more in promoting the product governed by the restraint. See
Meese, supra note 36, at 141–44 (discussing the evolution of the case law identifying such
benefits as cognizable); see also NCAA, 468 U.S. at 99–103 (holding that prevention of a
market failure is a cognizable benefit, even when challenged restraints limit price and
output). The result may be increased costs of distribution, enhanced demand for the product
in question and thus higher prices. See also Meese, supra note 36, at 145–61. However, as
the Supreme Court has recognized, such cost-based price increases do not constitute the sort
of anticompetitive harm that the Sherman Act condemns. See generally Leegin Creative
Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
81. See generally Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
82. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 99–103.
83. See Carrier, supra note 40, at 829 (finding that over 96 percent of Rule of Reason
cases fail for lack of proof of harm under either standard).
84. See supra notes 8–15 and accompanying text.
85. See Carrier, supra note 40, at 829 (reporting the number of cases that entailed
balancing); id. at 831–33 (describing the results and rationales of such cases).
86. For instance, in Reifert v. South. Central Wisconsin MLS Corp., 450 F.3d 312 (7th
Cir. 2006). The court’s entire discussion of balancing consisted of the following three
sentences:
The balance between pro- and anti-competitive effects weighs heavily in favor of
Article 16. Even in ‘open’ MLS areas such as Massachusetts and Alaska, where
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these decisions seem to recognize or assume that such efficiencies are
important in and of themselves, separate and apart from any propensity to
reduce prices in the relevant market. If the Supreme Court believes that
price is the sole relevant variable in Rule of Reason analysis, some lower
courts have not gotten the word.
Finally, courts and agencies applying section 7 of the Clayton Act to
mergers seem to have adopted a purchaser welfare standard. Thus,
efficiencies will only save a transaction that creates significant market
power if such efficiencies prevent price increases or result in lower prices.87
Even here, however, there is a bit of a caveat. Both the Department of
Justice and the Federal Trade Commission have opined that a merger
creating significant efficiencies may be lawful, even if price rises
temporarily, so long as there is a prospect that prices will fall in the long
run.88
Taken together, Antitrust Law reflects an ambiguous attitude toward the
appropriate definition of consumer welfare. On the one hand, there is some
support in the section 1 case law for a price-based standard, although the
question is not free from doubt. However, section 2 case law bends over
backward to accommodate efficiencies, validating any and all cost-reducing
conduct by monopolists, even when such conduct results in higher
purchaser prices. Put another way, section 2 law apparently treats
efficiency as an end in itself, the realization of which trumps the welfare of
purchasers, or at least those purchasers in the relevant market. On the other
side of the spectrum, the law governing mergers generally embraces a pricebased standard, but even here there is a caveat.

individuals who have not joined a Realtors Association may access an MLS
service, users must agree not to solicit the exclusive listings of other MLS users
during the term of the listing. If agents were reluctant to post their listings, for fear
that other agents would steal their clients, the market would become less
transparent and less efficient. Article 16 aids competition and fulfills the purposes
of the Sherman Act by providing a more transparent marketplace.
Id. The court made no effort to quantify the benefits that it identified or explain why they
exceeded the harms.
87. See FTC v. Univ. Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1223 (11th Cir. 1991) (“[W]e hold
that a defendant who seeks to overcome a presumption that a proposed acquisition would
substantially lessen competition must demonstrate that the intended acquisition would result
in significant economies and that these economies ultimately would benefit competition and,
hence, consumers.”); 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 9, § 10 (“[T]he
Agencies consider whether cognizable efficiencies likely would be sufficient to reverse the
merger’s potential to harm customers in the relevant market, e.g., by preventing price
increases in that market.”).
88. See 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 9, § 10 n.15 (“Efficiencies
relating to costs that are fixed in the short term are unlikely to benefit customers in the short
term, but can benefit customers in the longer run, e.g., if they make new product introduction
less expensive.”).
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II. BOTH CAMPS EMBRACE THE PARTIAL EQUILIBRIUM
TRADE-OFF MODEL
Despite their vehement “legal” disagreements, both camps employ the
same basic economic tools to illustrate and frame their arguments. In
particular, both camps invoke the so-called “partial equilibrium trade-off
model” to illustrate and bolster their arguments.89 First developed by
Oliver Williamson in the late 1960s, the model built upon the partial
equilibrium framework previously developed to ascertain the welfare
consequences, including the impact on consumer surplus, of departures
from perfect competition (e.g., monopoly and monopolistic competition).90
These earlier models had focused on the welfare impact of an exercise of
market power and the resulting reduction in output, concluding that this
reduction resulted in a misallocation of resources and reduced consumer
surplus.91 Williamson reformulated the model to recognize and incorporate
the impact of productive efficiencies. To be precise, Williamson developed
a tool for ascertaining the impact upon total welfare of a merger that both
confers market power on the resulting firm and results in productive
efficiencies.92 In so doing, Williamson expanded the focus of the analysis
to include a consideration of a transaction’s impact on both producer
surplus and consumer surplus, which, when combined, constituted total
economic surplus.93 While first developed to analyze mergers, the model
can have broader application as well, as Williamson himself noted.94
Proponents of a total welfare approach, including Williamson himself,
have invoked the partial equilibrium model to illustrate their preferred “total
welfare” standard. Indeed, Robert Bork, the leading proponent of the total
welfare approach, expressly employed the trade-off model to illustrate the
application of this standard, famously stating that one can employ the tradeoff model to illustrate all antitrust problems.95 According to Bork, producer
welfare, as defined by the model, should count in the antitrust calculus, with
89. See Williamson, supra note 20.
90. See, e.g., Harberger, supra note 17 (relying upon this model to illustrate deadweight
loss that occurs because of monopoly pricing).
91. See generally J.R. Hicks, The Rehabilitation of Consumers’ Surplus, 8 REV. ECON.
STUD. 108 (1941) (explaining how monopolistic output reduction distorts the allocation of
resources and thus reduces consumer surplus and overall economic welfare).
92. See Williamson, supra note 20, at 20–21 (articulating this objective of the model);
see also Oliver E. Williamson, Economics and Antitrust Enforcement: Transition Years,
17 ANTITRUST 61, 64 (2003) (describing the development of the partial equilibrium trade-off
model, at the behest of Donald Turner, as a means of evaluating welfare consequences of
mergers that produce efficiencies and market power).
93. See Williamson, supra note 20, at 21–23.
94. See, e.g., William J. Kolasky & Andrew R. Dick, The Merger Guidelines and the
Integration of Efficiencies into Antitrust Review of Horizontal Mergers, 71 ANTITRUST L.J.
207 (2003) (describing the role of Williamson’s trade-off model in merger enforcement
policy); Muris, supra note 69.
95. See BORK, supra note 2, at 108 (“This [Williamsonian] diagram can be used to
illustrate all antitrust problems, since it shows the relationship of the only two factors
involved, allocative efficiency and productive efficiency.”).
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the result that high prices are not a harm absent some additional reduction
in allocative efficiency.96 Others, including Williamson himself, have
invoked the partial equilibrium paradigm in support of this normative
approach.97
Moreover, Robert Lande, the original and still chief proponent of the
purchaser welfare approach, employs partial equilibrium tools to frame his
claim that Congress implicitly rejected a total welfare approach and meant
to ban any transactions that reduce purchaser welfare, which Lande equates
96. See id. at 110–12.
97. See, e.g., DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION 798–99 (2d ed. 1994) (relying upon the Williamson model to illustrate
efficiency-based antitrust policy); W. KIP VISCUSI, JOHN M. VERNON & JOSEPH E.
HARRINGTON, ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 126–27 (3d ed. 2000)
(reproducing the same graph and agreeing with Bork that the graph can be used to illustrate
antitrust problems); Thomas C. Arthur, The Costly Quest for Perfect Competition: Kodak
and Nonstructural Market Power, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 15–18 (1994) (invoking
Williamson’s model to illustrate the trade-off between market power and efficiencies when
analyzing trade restraints); Ken Heyer, Welfare Standards and Merger Analysis: Why Not
the Best, 2 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 29 (2006); Wesley J. Liebeler, Intrabrand “Cartels”
Under GTE Sylvania, 30 UCLA L. REV. 1, 15–16 (1982) (employing the model to illustrate
a “consumer welfare” standard applicable to all antitrust problems); Williamson, supra note
19, at 105 (“The emphasis throughout [this article] is on mergers, but much of the argument
generalizes easily.”).
Indeed, reliance on the partial equilibrium model and its implicit total welfare premise
to inform the normative content of antitrust policy predates Williamson’s explicit
articulation of the trade-off paradigm. For instance, even before Robert Bork contended that
antitrust law should maximize “consumer welfare” as he defined it, Professors Turner,
Mason, and Kaysen embraced an efficiency-based approach to the antitrust laws
indistinguishable from Bork’s. That is, according to these scholars, antitrust law should only
ban those practices, such as cartel pricing, that create or exercise market power without
creating offsetting efficiency benefits. See, e.g., KAYSEN & TURNER, supra note 19, at 44–45
(describing the primary goal of antitrust policy as eliminating “undue market power to the
extent consistent with maintaining desirable levels of economic performance”); id. at 77–79
(describing the elimination of “unreasonable market power” as the authors’ primary goal);
id. at 78 (“Market power resting on certain bases we consider ‘reasonable,’ because we think
it either undesirable or impossible to eliminate them. . . . [Market power resulting from
economies of scale] could be reduced only at the cost of producing at higher costs in
inefficiently small units; this price we do not desire to pay.”); id. at 133–34 (noting that a
merger that creates market power should be lawful if it is necessary to create productive
efficiencies). Moreover, Turner employed the same approach shortly after Williamson
published his results, albeit without mentioning Williamson. See Turner, supra note 19, at
1208–09 (assuming that the appropriate goal of economic policy is to “maximize aggregate
economic wealth” and endorsing the view that economies of scale should justify high
concentration). Thus, these authors apparently anticipated, or at least accidentally applied,
Williamson’s conclusion that the realization of nontrivial efficiencies would likely produce
efficiencies that exceeded allocative losses. See supra note 35 and accompanying text
(explaining Williamson’s conclusion in this regard). But cf. Williamson, supra note 20, at 64
(contending that Turner was surprised by Williamson’s conclusion that small efficiencies
would outweigh allocative losses from a merger to monopoly). Moreover, like Williamson
(and Bork), these scholars all implicitly followed the approach taken by Arnold Harberger in
1954, that is, treated the distributional impact of market power as irrelevant for welfare
purposes and focused only on the deadweight loss resulting from reduced output as a source
of harm. See Harberger, supra note 17 (equating “consumer welfare” with total welfare and
ignoring the distributional impact of market power).

2013]

THE (FALSE?) CHOICE

2221

with the partial equilibrium model’s concept of consumer surplus.98 In
particular, Lande employs Williamson’s model to identify and frame the
question scholars should ask (“did the drafters of the Sherman Act believe
that producer surplus should count in the antitrust calculus?”) when
examining the Act’s legislative history.99 Moreover, Lande emphasizes that
members of Congress assumed that large combinations could create
significant productive efficiencies of the sort recognized by Williamson’s
partial equilibrium paradigm but concludes that such combinations would
“pocket” these efficiencies, thereby depriving consumers of such
benefits.100 Thus, Lande concludes that the drafters of the Sherman Act
implicitly rejected the relevance of producer surplus for antitrust analysis
and thus rejected the “total welfare” definition of consumer welfare. He
also invokes the same model to illustrate his preferred normative standard
(purchaser welfare=consumer surplus). Other proponents of the “purchaser
welfare/consumer surplus” approach, all of whom invoke Lande’s work,
necessarily do the same.101
Both camps would also make descriptive or technocratic use of the model
as well. For instance, Lande contends that courts and enforcement agencies
can employ the model, at least conceptually, to discern the impact of
challenged practices on purchaser prices and thus consumer surplus and
purchaser welfare.102 Moreover, Bork too asserts that the model defines the
terms of an inquiry into the impact of a restraint.103 Thus, as a descriptive
98. See, e.g., Lande, supra note 2, at 71–80 (discussing the “Economic Effects of
Monopoly Power,” including “allocative inefficiency,” “reduction in consumer surplus,” and
possible “productive efficiencies”); id. at 74–77 (discussing the “transfer of ‘Consumers’
Surplus’ from Consumers to Monopolists”); id. at 75 (quoting Williamson for the
proposition that ordinary welfare analysis treats the transfer of consumer surplus to
producers as a wash).
99. See id. at 142–47 (employing Williamson’s partial equilibrium trade-off model to
illustrate distinction between the total welfare and the purchaser welfare standard in the
context of evaluating a merger).
100. See id. at 90–91 (“The trusts were condemned despite their efficiency in large part
because they kept the fruits of such efficiency.”).
101. See Steven C. Salop, Question: What Is the Real and Proper Antitrust Welfare
Standard? Answer: The True Consumer Welfare Standard, 22 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 336
(2010). For other examples employing this model to illustrate the distinction between total
welfare and purchaser welfare standards, see, for example, Sokol & Blair, supra note 37.
102. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 2, at 220 (“The relative sizes of the dead-weight loss and
the efficiency gain, in those cases where both exist, depend upon how one draws the
diagram, and how one should draw the diagram depends entirely upon what economic
analysis suggests about the reality the curves should reflect.”); Fisher, Lande & Vandaele,
supra note 57 (employing partial equilibrium methodology to determine conditions under
which efficiencies result in reduced prices despite merger to monopoly); Fisher & Lande,
supra note 26, at 1631 (explaining how antitrust enforcers can employ the Williamsonian
trade-off model while incorporating Congressional concerns over wealth transfers); id. at
1631 n.181 (contending that one can incorporate concerns about wealth distribution within
the Williamsonian trade-off model by assigning weights to the competing effects of a
transaction).
103. BORK, supra note 2, at 220 (“The relative sizes of the deadweight loss and the
efficiency gain, in cases where both exist, depends upon how one draws the diagram, and
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economic matter, both Lande and Bork necessarily embrace the partial
equilibrium trade-off model’s various purely economic/modeling
assumptions, not all of which are entirely realistic.
This universal embrace of the partial equilibrium trade-off model is not
surprising. Such models only achieve their dominant status by solving
various problems that a scientific community deems important.104
Moreover, such paradigms reflect significant investments in training and
repeated application, attributes that solidify a scientific community’s
commitment to the framework.105 Because of these two factors—social
utility and a community’s significant investment—scientific paradigms are
sticky and hard to displace.106 The partial equilibrium trade off paradigm is
no exception to these principles. Economists have employed the paradigm
with success in a variety of contexts, and the community trains its
practitioners to embrace and apply it widely.
The trade-off tool that both schools of thought embrace does not purport
to generate a completely accurate description of economic reality. For one
thing, it is costly to gather the information necessary to conduct a true
partial equilibrium trade-off analysis.107 Moreover, even if a decision
maker could gather all of the information called for, the model could still
produce inaccurate results. It is, after all, a model and thus by definition
only a proxy for reality.108 Indeed, Williamson himself referred to the
model as “naïve” and, later, “simple.”109 Finally, as I have shown
how one draws the diagram depends entirely upon what economic analysis suggests about
the reality the curves should reflect.”).
104. See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 24 (4th ed.
2012) (“Paradigms gain their status because they are more successful than their competitors
in solving a few problems that a group of practitioners has come to recognize as acute.”).
105. See Thomas S. Kuhn, The Essential Tension: Tradition and Invention in Scientific
Research, in THE ESSENTIAL TENSION: STUDIES IN SCIENTIFIC TRADITION AND CHANGE 229
(1977) (explaining how training that solidifies paradigms creates “mental sets” or
“Einstellungen”); see also KUHN, supra note 104, at 76 (“So long as the tools a paradigm
supplies continue to prove capable of solving the problems it defines, science moves fastest
and penetrates most deeply through confident employment of those tools. The reason is
clear. As in manufacture so in science—retooling is an extravagance to be reserved for the
occasion that demands it.”).
106. See KUHN, supra note 104, at 77–80 (entrenched paradigms resist change); id. at 78
(explaining how an incumbent paradigm resists challenges by adjusting itself through “ad
hoc modifications and articulations” to incorporate seemingly contradictory evidence).
107. See BORK, supra note 2, at 221 (“The diagram tells us nothing because there is
nothing built into it that shows whether there will be any restriction of output in such cases
or, if there is, what the amount will be. Without that information we have no idea of the size
of the dead-weight loss, if any.”).
108. See Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 234 (1st Cir. 1983)
(“[W]hile technical economic discussion helps to inform the antitrust laws, those laws
cannot precisely replicate the economists’ (sometimes conflicting) views. . . . Rules that
seek to embody every economic complexity and qualification may well, through the vagaries
of administration, prove counter-productive, undercutting the very economic ends they seek
to serve.”).
109. Williamson, supra note 20, at 20–22 (describing the so-called “naïve” trade-off
model); id. at 64 (reiterating that the model was naïve and “simple”). Note that many of
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elsewhere, application of this paradigm has produced misleading doctrinal
tests in some contexts, particularly the treatment of partial vertical
integration that survives per se treatment because it may overcome market
failure.110
This mutual embrace of the “naïve” partial equilibrium paradigm, its
simplifying assumptions, the problematic results it produces, and courts’
inconsistent embrace of the “purchaser” and “total” welfare standard raises
an obvious question, that is, is there some other set of economic tools that
can help (re)frame the debate about the appropriate welfare criterion to be
applied in the antitrust context? One obvious alternative would be the
General Equilibrium Model. After all, neither the Sherman Act nor its
legislative history mentions or endorses the partial equilibrium trade-off
model or any of its components (e.g., consumer surplus or producer
surplus), at least by name. Moreover, as other scholars have noted,
members of Congress were likely unaware of Alfred Marshall’s work,
which first articulated the partial equilibrium model, thereby further
attenuating the possibility that they meant to embrace a “total welfare” or
“consumer surplus” standard, at least as such.111 In any event, the Supreme
Court has repeatedly held that courts may embrace new and better
economic models for evaluating challenged conduct, even to the point of
overruling previous decisions that rested upon old and now discredited
models.112 Indeed, failure to embrace a new and better model (if there is
these assumptions derive from perfect competition. See infra notes 137–39 and
accompanying text (describing the influence of perfect competition on the partial
equilibrium model).
110. See Alan J. Meese, Reframing Antitrust in Light of Scientific Revolution:
Accounting for Transaction Costs in Rule of Reason Analysis, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 457, 503–23
(2010).
111. See Lande, supra note 2, at 88 (“It is extremely unlikely that the legislators’ distaste
for monopoly pricing could have been based upon its impact on allocative efficiency: the
concept of allocative efficiency was, at best, on the verge of discovery by leading economic
theorists when the Sherman Act was passed.”). Some proponents of the “purchaser welfare”
approach have argued that congressional ignorance of Alfred Marshall’s work rebuts the
claim that the Sherman Act incorporates an “allocative efficiency” standard. See Kaplow,
supra note 64, at 207–08 (explaining the date of Marshall’s contribution and contending that
it is “inconceivable that members of Congress were motivated at all by such an argument”).
However, if Congress was ignorant of Alfred Marshall’s work, then they were also ignorant
of the concept of consumer surplus. See Miroslav Svoda, History and Troubles of Consumer
Surplus, 2008 PRAGUE ECON. PAPERS, 230 (explaining that Marshall coined the term
“consumer surplus” and popularized the concept in the English-speaking world). Ironically,
no one doubts that the 1890 Congress understood the concept of productive efficiency. See
supra notes 67–70 and accompanying text. If, as Oliver Williamson and F.M. Scherer have
suggested, productive efficiency is simply one aspect of allocative efficiency, then perhaps
scholars like Professor Kaplow have been too hasty in their conclusion that Congress could
not have deemed allocative efficiency as the predominant goal of the Sherman Act.
112. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007);
State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997); Bus. Elecs., Inc. v. Sharp Elecs., Corp., 485 U.S.
717, 732 (1988) (holding that the Sherman Act embraced the common law along with its
“dynamic potential” and that courts should adjust antitrust doctrine to account for advances
in economic theory).
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one) would seem to contravene the Sherman Act’s requirement that courts
employ “reason” to determine whether a restraint produces the
“consequences of monopoly” or, instead, “fructifies” and “advances”
trade.113 Perhaps there is a different model that can inform antitrust’s
assessment of challenged conduct, a model that can help reframe the debate
over the appropriate normative content of antitrust, even to the point of
generating a consensus between now-competing camps. Thus, some
reexamination of the partial equilibrium trade-off model would seem
appropriate.
III. THE PARTIAL EQUILIBRIUM TRADE-OFF MODEL114
Every antitrust scholar and practitioner has employed and invoked the
partial equilibrium trade-off model, often without even knowing it. First
expressly articulated by Oliver Williamson in 1968, the model builds upon
the more basic partial equilibrium framework that Alfred Marshall first
developed in the late nineteenth century for evaluating the welfare
consequences of perfect competition and monopoly.115 The model begins
by positing a particular “industry,” isolated from every other industry in the
economy, except to the extent that the industry must purchase inputs from
other industries.116 The “industry” consists of two categories of actors:
firms, who manufacture products, and consumers, who, depending upon the
price, purchase them. Such industries correspond (roughly) to the antitrust
concept of a “relevant market,” defined for the purpose of evaluating claims
under sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and section 7 of the Clayton
Act.117
Scholars and practitioners employ a familiar graphical apparatus to
represent the model. The model begins with two axes: the vertical axis
represents the price of the product, and the horizontal axis represents the
quantity demanded by consumers or supplied by the industry’s firms, as

113. Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 55 (1911) (approving common
law decisions that had repudiated previous doctrine because of the advent of “more accurate
economic conceptions”).
114. Readers may omit this part if they are familiar with the model.
115. See ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS (1890); see also Harberger,
supra note 17, at 78 (graphically illustrating welfare loss from monopoly output reduction).
116. See generally Brian J. Loasby, Hypothesis and Paradigm in the Theory of the Firm,
81 ECON. J. 863, 876 (1971) (explaining how the pioneers of imperfect competition theory
retained the concept of an “industry” implied by the partial equilibrium model). Cf.
Harberger, supra note 17, at 84 (explaining that the assignment of firms to particular
industries obscured underlying distinctions between firms’ products and thus overstated the
competitive overlap between such products).
117. See, e.g., Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 453 (1993) (holding
that an attempted monopolization claim depends upon proof that there is a “dangerous
probability” that the defendant will achieve power in a properly defined relevant market);
Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 34–35 (1984) (determining that
proof of power in a relevant market is necessary to establish a per se tying violation).
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appropriate.118 Beginning with these two axes, the model employs the
familiar “demand schedule” to encapsulate all relevant information about
actual and potential consumers who purchase or may purchase the
industry’s product.119 This demand curve slopes down and to the right,
indicating that consumers will purchase more of the product, holding
everything else constant, as its price falls.120 The slope of the curve turns
on just how sensitive or “elastic” demand is to changes in price, a factor
that depends, among other things, upon the extent to which products
manufactured in other industries nominally not incorporated in the model
are close substitutes for those produced by the industry in question.121
The model also posits a supply curve, which represents how much output
the industry will produce at any given price.122 Just as the demand curve
aggregates information about responses by individual consumers to price
changes, so too does the industry supply curve incorporate and reflect
aggregate responses to price changes by individual firms, not all of whom
are necessarily present in the industry at a given moment in time.123 As a
result, the location and shape of the industry-wide supply curve will
necessarily depend upon the location and shapes of individual firm-level
supply curves.
Two different factors will determine the shape of these curves, namely,
technology and the price of various inputs that firms might employ in the
production process. The former will determine the various possible input
combinations (labor, capital, and raw materials) that firms might employ to
produce a given unit of output. The latter will determine which particular
process and thus which input combination firms will employ given the
assumption that firms will employ the least costly method of production.124
Given these data, then, we can construct curves for each individual firm that
represent both the marginal and average costs of producing each possible
level of output, from zero units to infinity. From these curves, in turn, we
can derive how much output, if any, a given firm will produce at a given
price. In the long run, of course, firms will set output where price equals
marginal cost, so long as that price also exceeds average total cost.125
118. See KELVIN LANCASTER, INTRODUCTION TO MODERN MICROECONOMICS 20–21 (2d
ed. 1974).
119. See id. at 14–20.
120. See id. at 14–20, 241–45.
121. See id. at 25–29; see also CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 44, at 99 (describing the
concept of elasticity and how the extent of elasticity depends upon the “availability of
substitute products”).
122. See LANCASTER, supra note 118, at 14.
123. See id. (explaining how the industry supply curve reflects a compilation of supply
decisions by all of the industry’s individual firms).
124. See id. at 119 (adopting the proposition that firms will always choose the least costly
method of production).
125. See N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 288 (6th ed. 2011) (“The
competitive firm’s long-run supply curve is the portion of its marginal cost curve that lies
above average total cost.”).
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Very often, economists portray the cost curves of individual firms as
follows: marginal cost curves slope up and to the right, while average cost
curves are U-shaped.126 This portrayal reflects two assumptions. First,
production requires a certain “fixed” or “set up” cost, with the result that
average production costs are high at low levels of output but fall steadily
other things being equal as output rises. Second, the incremental cost of
producing a given level of output rises along with the firm’s output, a
phenomenon attributable to any number of factors.127 For instance, as a
firm’s output rises, its inputs may become more expensive and/or of
reduced quality. Or, a firm may be unable to vary certain inputs as rapidly
as others, thereby forcing the firm to rely upon a less than efficient
combination of inputs.128 Finally, the upward slope may simply reflect an
underlying technology that exhibits decreasing returns to scale, even
assuming constant input prices and complete flexibility of input use.129
Regardless of why the marginal cost curve slopes upward, it will
intersect the average cost curve at its minimum point and then continually
rise faster and more steeply than the average cost curve.130 Thus, so long as
price exceeds average total cost at this point, any firm will maximize its
profits by producing where price equals marginal costs. At the same time,
such a price and resulting output will not last long in a competitive market,
as supranormal prices will draw additional firms into the market, thereby
driving price back down to that level equal to minimum average cost and
eliminating any excess profits.131
Despite the ordinary portrayal of firm-level curves as “U-shaped,”
Williamson’s articulation of the trade-off model employs a horizontal
average cost curve as the industry supply curve, albeit without explaining

126. See LANCASTER, supra note 118, at 153–54 (explaining how and why average cost
curves are often assumed to be U-shaped).
127. See id. at 153 (explaining that “upper limit on the availability of some input” and “a
minimum outlay on some input” combine to create U-shaped cost curves).
128. See id. at 134–37 (describing the impact of input limitation on cost curves).
129. See id. at 132–33 (describing the impact of decreasing returns to scale on cost
curves).
130. See id. (describing the impact of decreasing returns to scale on cost curves); id. at
134–37 (describing the impact of input limitation on cost curves). Moreover, economists
often posit a distinction between “marginal” and “average” costs, with the later including
“fixed” or “set up” costs, that is, costs that the firm necessarily incurs regardless of its level
of output. Given this assumption, the rising marginal cost curve intersects the average total
cost curve at its lowest point, and then continues rising at a steeper slope than the average
total cost curve, the latter of which by definition incorporates information about the costs of
all of a firm’s output, including that output produced at a relatively low cost.
131. If price is below firms’ minimum average cost, then firms will not produce any
output. If price rises above minimum average cost, then incumbent firms will increase their
output to where price equals marginal cost, a point at which price and this average revenue
will exceed average cost. Because price exceeds average cost at this level of output, each
firm will earn an above-normal return—a return that will attract new entrants. The
additional output supplied by these new entrants will push price back down to the point
where cost equals average total cost.
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the source of such a curve.132 Moreover, this portrayal applies even to
monopolized industries occupied by a single firm, the result of the merger
to monopoly that Williamson posits.133 There are, however, two possible
explanations for such a horizontal cost curve. First, if all firms (and
potential firms) in the industry have access to the same technology, then an
indefinite number of firms will enjoy the same minimum average cost.
Moreover, if, taken together, these firms employ only a small portion of
various factors of production available, then the cost of such inputs will
remain constant and independent of industry output. Taken together, these
two assumptions—perfectly replicable technology and constant input
costs—will result in a horizontal supply curve for the industry in question,
even though each individual firm enjoys fixed costs and a U-shaped cost
curve.134 Second, contrary to the assumption of U-shaped cost curves
mentioned above, each individual firm might experience horizontal cost
curves, reflecting the absence of fixed costs, constant returns to scale, and
the ability to vary all inputs with impunity.135 If so, then marginal cost will
equal average cost for each firm in the relevant industry, and the supply
curve will be flat throughout. Indeed, unlike Williamson himself, some
who reproduce Williamson’s diagram have labeled this cost curve as a
horizontal marginal cost curve, thereby implying this second explanation
for constant industry costs.136 This second explanation, of course, must be
the implicit explanation for a horizontal average cost curve for a
monopolized industry. In such cases the firm’s supply curve is the
132. See Williamson, supra note 19, at 21–22. He also posits such a curve for a
postmerger monopolist. See id. at 23; see also Harberger, supra note 17, at 77 (articulating
the assumption that long run average costs are “close to constant in the relevant range”
because “in the long run, resources can be allocated among our manufacturing industries in
such a way as to yield roughly constant returns”).
133. See Williamson, supra note 19, at 21–23.
134. See CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 44, at 97 (noting that the long-run industry
supply curve could be flat for this reason “as long as the industry accounts for only a small
fraction of any one factor’s total employment”); id. (explaining that the long-run industry
supply curve might be upward sloping if “there are only a few firms that can produce at low
costs”). Note that this result follows even if firms cannot completely vary all of their inputs
in the short run. If this phenomenon results in upward sloping marginal cost curves for
individual firms, then additional firms employing the same technology can produce at a scale
small enough to avoid this constraint.
135. See LANCASTER, supra note 118, at 129–31 (describing such “unconstrained”
horizontal cost curves resulting from constant returns to scale); id. at 141–47 (describing and
illustrating cost curves with fixed costs and (eventual) constant returns to scale). Here again,
the industry would have to account for a small proportion of the inputs in question, thereby
ensuring a constant cost of inputs. Of course, the presence of fixed costs is consistent with a
horizontal average cost curve for all levels of output above a certain quantity, whereby
marginal cost equals average cost after the impact of fixed costs is exhausted. See id. at 146–
47. Such an effect assumes that marginal cost is itself constant at all levels of output above
where marginal and average cost becomes equal. See id.
136. See, e.g., CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 44, at 798–99; Blair & Sokol, supra note
37, at 483, 488, 494, 499; Heyer, supra note 19. Another source simply abjures both
“marginal cost” and “average cost” and simply refers to “the supply curve.” See SCHERER &
ROSS, supra note 57, at 186–87.
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industry’s supply curve; thus, if the individual firm experienced fixed costs,
the industry curve would not be horizontal.
Of course, the intersection of the demand and supply curves describes the
industry’s equilibrium output and resulting market price, at least in the short
run. So far we have said nothing about the implications of the model for
total economic welfare or purchaser welfare. Thus far the model as
described is consistent with various assumptions of perfect competition.137
In a competitive market, price will equal marginal cost, and producers will
earn normal profits, that is, recoup their costs plus a reasonable rate of
return. Consumers, however, receive significant surplus; the downwardsloping demand curve indicates that nearly all of those who in fact purchase
the industry’s product were willing to pay more for it than the market
price.138 Thus, the area between the market price and the demand curve
indicates the amount of surplus that consumers derive from the industry’s
output.139
The partial equilibrium paradigm can also evaluate the welfare
consequences of departures from perfect competition, however. For
instance, what about monopoly and the resulting reduction in output below
the equilibrium level described above (a reduction resulting from the
exercise of market power)? Other things being equal, such a reduction in
output below this equilibrium level will increase prices and thus reduce
consumer surplus in two distinct ways. First, fewer consumers will
purchase the industry’s product and thus forgo the surplus they otherwise
would have received as a result of such purchases.140 Second, other
137. See, e.g., FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT 76–81 (1921)
(detailing various assumptions of the perfect competition model). For instance, as explained
in the text, the model apparently assumes that production technology is freely available to all
firms, including potential entrants, thereby justifying an industry-wide horizontal average
cost curve. See F.A. HAYEK, The Meaning of Competition, in INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC
ORDER 92, 97–98 (1948) (describing the assumption of the perfect competition model that “a
large number of people are producing the same commodity and command the same objective
facilities and opportunities for doing so”); KNIGHT, supra, at 78 (describing perfect
competition’s assumption that knowledge is freely available).
138. See Hicks, supra note 91, at 112–13.
139. See SCHERER & ROSS, supra note 57, at 24–25; Hicks, supra note 91, at 112–13.
140. See Harberger, supra note 17, at 78; Hicks, supra note 91, at 112–13. Of course,
these consumers will spend the income they would have spent on the industry’s product
elsewhere. However, the Marshallian model assumes that such expenditures will produce
little or no surplus, with the result that the reduction in surplus in the primary market indeed
represents the full reduction in overall consumer surplus. As one scholar has put it: “The
[Marshallian] consumer surplus triangle DAF is constructed on the assumption that if this
particular commodity was withdrawn from the market, the consumers would have to fritter
away their money outlay of OHAF [the rectangle equal to output times price] in increasing
their marginal purchases of other commodities from which they will obtain only a negligible
amount of surplus. (If we draw consumers’ surplus diagrams for other commodities, this
will be shown by small triangular increments at the margin.) This is true even when there
are substitutes for the particular commodity, for in constructing the demand curve for it,
Marshall had already assumed that consumers will take full account of the fact that
substitutes are available at given prices. Thus (subject to the assumption of constant
marginal utility of money) the triangle under the demand curve measures the consumers’
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consumers will continue to purchase the product in question, albeit at a
higher price, thereby deriving less surplus per purchase than they derived in
a competitive market.141 According to the “purchaser welfare” camp, both
such reductions in consumer surplus represent a “harm” under the antitrust
statutes.142 By contrast, the total welfare camp would conclude that only
the first (and relatively small) reduction in surplus constitutes antitrust
harm, as the second reduction represents a mere transfer of income from
producers to consumers and thus does not itself reduce welfare.143 Still,
both camps would agree that, based upon an application of the partial
equilibrium model, transformation of an industry from perfect competition
to monopoly and the resulting output reduction will, other things being
equal, produce cognizable harm and should thus, without more, justify
antitrust regulation.144
Of course, all else is not always equal; there is often “more.” One must
also ask how an industry became monopolized in the first place. One
possibility, of course, is predatory tactics, whereby a firm excludes rivals on
some basis other than superior efficiency.145 Monopoly acquired in this
manner would, according to the partial equilibrium model, both reduce total
welfare and purchaser welfare, albeit not by the same amounts, and thus
properly be subject to condemnation.146 Another possibility is that onceindependent participants in an industry may merge to form a monopoly.
Absent some resulting technological change, the partial equilibrium model
predicts that such a merger would, like the predatory activity just described,
reduce both total welfare and purchaser welfare.
There is one last possibility, namely, that transformation from
competition to monopoly enables the realization of technological or other
efficiencies that reduce production costs. Such a transformation can occur
in two ways. First, a single firm in a once-competitive market can realize
such efficiencies through “internal expansion,” whereby it realizes
efficiencies and underprices it rivals, driving those rivals from the market
and obtaining a monopoly.147 Second, all the firms in the once-competitive

surplus on this commodity only because the money outlay which yields a surplus in this
particular use will become marginal expenditure elsewhere.” See HLA MYINT, THEORIES OF
WELFARE ECONOMICS 162 (1965).
141. See CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 44, at 135 (distinguishing between “monopoly
profits” and “deadweight loss,” both of which result from exercise of monopoly power).
142. See supra notes 8–10 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 11–15 and accompanying text; see also Harberger, supra note 17
(finding that economy-wide harm from deadweight loss resulting from monopolistic prices
equaled less than 1 percent of GDP).
144. See supra notes 24–28 and accompanying text; see also Williamson, supra note 45.
145. See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S 585, 605 (1985)
(quoting 3 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 626b (1978)); see also
BORK, supra note 2, at 160 (defining “improper exclusion,” as “exclusion not the result of
superior efficiency” (cited with approval in Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 603 n.29)).
146. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 2, at 160, 344–45.
147. See Williamson, supra note 20, at 25–26.
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market can merge, creating a monopoly and thereby realizing productive
efficiencies that are not available to competitive, smaller firms.148
Williamson’s articulation and application of the partial equilibrium
model focused on the second source of efficiencies.149 That is, Williamson
posited that the combination of previously separate firms could allow the
newly created firm to realize efficiencies that were not available to any of
the previously separate firms. In Williamson’s account, the efficiencies
manifested themselves as a downward shift in the horizontal average
cost/supply curve and resulting reduction in the cost of producing the
industry’s remaining output.150 While Williamson did not describe the
exact source of such efficiencies, there are a few possibilities. For instance,
the new firm could perhaps take advantage of production technologies that
require a certain scale of output not available to smaller firms.151
Although he dubbed them “productive efficiencies,” Williamson
recognized that such efficiencies represented an improvement in the
allocation of resources, given that the new firm could produce the same
output with fewer resources.152 He also recognized that this allocational
improvement could offset the negative allocational consequences of market
power resulting from the posited merger to monopoly.153 Recognizing this
tradeoff, Williamson sought to arrive at generalizations about the welfare
consequences of mergers to monopoly that both reduced output in a
particular industry while at the same time reducing production costs.154
William conceded that such transactions could, despite efficiencies,

148. See, e.g., CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 44, at 798–99.
149. See Williamson, supra note 20, at 21 (“The effects on resource allocation of a
merger that yields economies but extends market power can be investigated in a partial
equilibrium context.”). Of course, Williamson did not claim to be the first to recognize that
mergers could create such efficiencies. Indeed, nearly two decades earlier, Professors
Kaysen and Turner had anticipated Williamson’s general result, contending that mergers that
create market power should nonetheless be lawful if they also resulted in substantial
efficiencies, without regard to price effects. See, e.g., KAYSEN & TURNER, supra note 19, at
133–34. At the same time, as Williamson noted, Kaysen and Turner basically “fudged” the
definition of “substantial,” leaving Williamson to construct a framework for assessing the
trade-off between market power and efficiencies. See Williamson, supra note 20, at 20; see
also Williamson, supra note 20, at 64 (describing how Williamson examined the trade-off
question at Turner’s behest).
150. See Williamson, supra note 20, at 21–23.
151. See, e.g., LANCASTER, supra note 118, at 155–57 (describing technological
indivisibilities that give rise to reduced production costs at higher levels of output); id. at 157
(representing such indivisibilities with a downward shift in the marginal and average cost
curves).
152. See Williamson, supra note 20, at 22 n.4 (explaining that “[productive] inefficiency
is also a dead-weight loss”); id. at 22 (“The net allocative effect [of a transaction] is given by
the difference [between deadweight welfare loss and productive efficiency gains].”).
153. See id. at 21–22; see also SCHERER & ROSS, supra note 57, at 22 (explaining that
productive inefficiency resulting from failure to realize available economies of scale
“represents a deadweight loss of resources that could otherwise be employed in alternative
production”).
154. See Williamson, supra note 20, at 21–22.
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increase prices and thus reduce consumer surplus.155 Nonetheless, he
concluded that mergers to monopoly that produced significant cost savings
generally increased overall welfare, despite any resulting price increase.156
IV. SHORTCOMINGS OF THE MODEL
As its name implies, the partial equilibrium trade-off model does not
necessarily tell the whole story about the impact of a transaction on
economic welfare. Indeed, even Williamson himself has repeatedly
referred to the model as the “naïve” and “simple” trade-off model.157 To be
sure, the model is not as “simple” or “naïve” as perfect competition. For
instance, the model assumes economies of scale (the source of productive
efficiencies and thus cost reductions), barriers to entry (necessary to protect
the merger-created monopoly), and transaction costs sufficient to prevent
consumers from bargaining with the postmerger monopolist to induce an
output increase via price discrimination.158 Nonetheless, the model
embraces other assumptions of perfect competition, including (at least
implicitly) competition (and thus marginal cost pricing) in all other
markets.159 More generally, the model rests upon the identification of a
“relevant market,” itself a fiction, completely isolated from other
As a result, the model
(presumed) relevant product markets.160
155. See id. at 27–28 (recognizing that a merger that increases price will reduce consumer
surplus).
156. See id. at 21–23.
157. See id. at 21.
158. See Calabresi, supra note 15, at 69–71 (explaining that, absent transaction costs,
consumers would bargain to induce monopolists to increase output to a competitive level).
Presumably Calabresi had in mind a price discrimination scheme, whereby firms expand
output by charging different firms different prices. See also CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note
44, at 438–39 (explaining how perfect price discrimination can result in “monopolistic”
output identical to competitive output). See generally G.L.S. SHACKLE, THE YEARS OF HIGH
THEORY 13 (1967) (explaining how the possibility of increasing returns to scale undermined
perfect competition by inducing a single firm to take over the market).
159. See VISCUSI, VERNON & HARINGTON, supra note 97, at 75–76 (explaining how
departures from perfect competition necessitate the embrace of a partial equilibrium model
and the resulting limiting assumptions); see also HAYEK, supra note 137, at 94 (“Most
[assumptions of the perfect competition model] are equally assumed in the discussion of the
various ‘imperfect’ or ‘monopolistic’ markets, which throughout assume certain unrealistic
‘perfections.’”); KAYSEN & TURNER, supra note 19, at 67 n.25 (assuming, without
explanation, that “the equality of private and social costs, especially in the areas relevant to
our study, is not a major problem.”); Richard N. Langlois, Transaction Costs, Production
Costs, and the Passage of Time, in COASEAN ECONOMICS: LAW AND ECONOMICS AND THE
NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 1, 2–3 (Steven G. Medema ed., 1997) (noting that pioneers
of oligopoly theory invoked various assumptions of the perfect competition model).
160. See Orbach, supra note 2, at 138–39; see also Fisher & Lande, supra note 26, at
1626 n.173 (“In real-world markets, one rarely encounters situations such as a court’s model.
A wide variety of firms create heterogeneous products of differing substitutability.
Regardless of where a court draws the market boundaries, not every product included in the
market is a perfect substitute, nor are excluded goods nonsubstitutable. Some items not
included in the market may, to varying degrees, constrain the monopoly power of included
firms, and therefore should be considered in any analysis of market power.”); Harberger,

2232

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

intentionally ignores the impact of the transaction and its resulting impact
on production costs and output upon other markets.161 For instance, the
model ignores the existence of any externalities, positive or negative, that
the industry might impose or confer on individuals and/or firms in other
markets.162 This exclusion of such externalities is by fiat; it does not flow
from any other assumptions of the model and is in fact inconsistent with the
assumption of transaction costs.163 Thus, the model would condemn a
transaction that reduced output in an industry characterized by externalities,
even if the correlative reduction in externalities increases welfare in other
markets so much as to more than offset the welfare loss in the original
market.164
Perhaps more famously, the model ignores more traditional “second
best” considerations that can undermine the model’s conclusion in

supra note 17, at 84 (explaining how assumed “industries” likely include “products which
are only remote substitutes” for each other); George J. Stigler, The Economist and the
Problem of Monopoly, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 8–9 (1982) (“Consider the problem of defining
a market, within which the existence of competition or some form of monopoly is to be
determined. The typical antitrust case is an almost impudent exercise in economic
gerrymandering.”).
161. See, e.g., VISCUSI, VERNON & HARINGTON, supra note 97, at 76 (explaining how
partial equilibrium tools focus on impacts in a particular market to avoid second-best
problems presented by general equilibrium analysis when some markets are characterized by
monopoly, externalities, and other departures from perfect competition); Richard H. Fink,
General and Partial Equilibrium Theory in Bork’s Antitrust Analysis, 2 CONTEMP. POL’Y
ANALYSIS 12, 15 (1984) (explaining that the partial equilibrium model assumes away the
impact of a market upon other markets); Arnold C. Harberger, Three Basic Postulates for
Applied Welfare Economics: An Interpretive Essay, 9 J. ECON. LITERATURE 785, 789–91
(1971) (conceding that welfare analyses performed by economists are usually partial
equilibrium in nature but also arguing that general equilibrium welfare analyses of such
problems are possible); Oliver E. Williamson, Economies As an Antitrust Defense Revisited,
125 U. PA. L. REV. 699, 702 n.10 (1977) (“Partial equilibrium analysis involves an
examination of one market while assuming that incomes, other prices, and production
conditions remain unchanged. Second-order interdependencies are thus assumed to be
negligible. When changes in the relevant market do affect the general economy, a general
equilibrium analysis, in which prices and quantities for all markets must be determined
together, is usually appropriate.”); see also LANCASTER, supra note 118, at 12–13 (explaining
how microeconomists generally employ such “partial analysis” when examining the impact
of price on demand and supply in a particular market).
162. See Williamson, supra note 20, at 22 n.4 (articulating the model’s assumption that
the private costs of the firms in the industry equal the social costs of the activity).
163. To be sure, one could posit the existence of such costs within the market while
assuming zero intermarket costs. There is, however, no indication that Williamson or other
practitioners of the model employed such an assumption.
164. See CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 44, at 148 (explaining how monopolization of
an industry characterized by negative externalities can improve overall economic welfare by
reducing output and thus reducing harm from externalities); Daniel Crane, Harmful Output
in the Antitrust Domain: Lessons from the Tobacco Industry, 39 GA. L. REV. 321 (2005)
(contending that antitrust law should consider such externalities); see also Orbach, supra
note 2, at 152 (discussing how conventional antitrust measures of “consumer welfare” ignore
the possible negative impact of industry output on the consumers who purchase the products
in question).
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particular cases.165 Such considerations may arise if other markets in the
economy are already monopolized and thus characterized by reduced output
and resulting prices significantly above cost. In such circumstances,
merger-induced monopoly output reduction and the transfer of resources to
previously monopolized markets may actually improve overall welfare by
increasing output (and reducing significant distortions) in regions of such
monopolists’ inframarginal output characterized by significant price-cost
gaps and thus large distortions.166 Indeed, such an improvement can occur
even if a merger produces no productive efficiencies whatsoever.
Nonetheless, the partial equilibrium model excludes such considerations by
fiat, thereby compelling condemnation of some practices that, while
reducing welfare in a particular market, in fact result in a more efficient
allocation of resources in the economy as a whole.
Proponents of the partial equilibrium model assert that the exclusion of
impacts on other markets is necessary to generate definitive conclusions
about the welfare consequences of studied transactions or practices.167
There may, in fact, be good reasons to ignore externalities and other second
best problems when evaluating the welfare consequences of a merger or
other practice or transaction that might produce market power. For
165. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 2, at 113–15 (contending that antitrust analysis should
generally take a partial equilibrium approach that ignores possible second-best
considerations); KAYSEN & TURNER, supra note 19, at 12 (embracing the so-called
“Pigouvian assumption” that “we can apply the concept of efficiency to individual industries
and firms,” even though “economy-wide efficiency is impossible to achieve” because of
second-best considerations); VISCUSI, VERNON & HARINGTON, supra note 97, at 76
(explaining that partial equilibrium analysis obviates the need to examine second-best
considerations); Williamson, supra note 161, at 711–12.
166. See Hicks, supra note 91, at 114 (explaining how output reduction in a previously
competitive market could actually enhance overall welfare by transferring resources to
industries characterized by market power and above-cost pricing, thereby removing
significant distortions in the allocation of resources); id. at 114–15 (explaining how such
considerations establish that output in a competitive market might be above the social
optimum). Or, as Williamson himself put it: “Certain economic effects may therefore go
undetected, and occasionally behavior which appears to yield net economic benefits in a
partial equilibrium analysis will result in net losses when investigated in a general
equilibrium context. Such a condition has been shown to exist in an economy in which
monopoly exists in many sectors. Thus, whereas partial equilibrium analysis indicates that
an increase in the monopoly price in any one sector invariably yields a loss, viewed more
generally such an isolated price increase may actually lead to a desirable reallocation of
resources.” See Williamson, supra note 20, at 23.
167. Thus, a leading text on antitrust and regulation explains the usefulness of the partial
equilibrium trade-off model as follows: “[Outside of perfect competition] it becomes
incredibly complex to deal with a general equilibrium model in which some markets are
monopolies, externalities exist, imperfect information about product quality obtains, and so
on. Hence, we now turn to welfare economics concepts in the context of a single market,
effectively ignoring the interactions with all other markets.” VISCUSI, VERNON &
HARINGTON, supra note 97, at 76; Loasby, supra note 116, at 864 (“Micro-economics, on the
other hand, simply assumes away some of the interdependencies which form the subjectmatter of macro-system analysis.”). But see Harberger, supra note 161, at 789–91 (decrying
the tendency of economists to ignore the impact of studied practices on more than one
market).
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instance, it seems unlikely that antitrust law provides the optimal regulatory
tool for dealing with most, if not all, externalities. For one thing,
substantial bodies of private and public law deal expressly with
externalities; think of the common law of nuisance as well as state and
federal environmental regulation, all three of which seek to regulate
externalities resulting from the unreasonable use of real property.168 Given
these three bodies of law, there is simply no regulatory void for antitrust to
fill in many circumstances. To be sure, externalities may still exist despite
these bodies of law, but the existence of such externalities does not thereby
justify their consideration by antitrust courts. For one thing, not all
externalities are inefficient; sometimes soot spewing from a factory onto a
farmer’s land is the most efficient use of the farmer’s property, whether or
not the factory owner pays for the use.169 Moreover, the cost of eliminating
even inefficient externalities will not always exceed the benefits of doing
so.170 Just as there is an optimal amount of crime and other forms of law
violation, given the cost of deterrence, there is also an optimal level of
inefficient externalities.171 Indeed, Ronald Coase has opined that the
ubiquity of (inefficient?) externalities raises a presumption that the cost of
correcting such market failures exceeds the welfare benefits of doing so.172
If Coase is correct, then the case for assigning this objective to antitrust,
where more appropriate bodies of law have failed, is weak indeed.173
Simply put, the continuing presence of externalities despite the presence of
various regulatory regimes designed to combat them does not begin to
justify the incorporation of externality concerns into antitrust analysis.
Or, consider the example of tobacco. On the one hand, the product
seems plainly harmful, both to the user, who does not internalize the entire
harm, but also to third parties, by means of second-hand smoke. Thus,
some have argued that antitrust law should tolerate collusive arrangements
among cigarette manufacturers, for instance, given that such agreements
will reduce consumption of a harmful product.174 However, both state and
national governments already regulate tobacco quite heavily by means of
warning labels, public service announcements, outright smoking bans and,
most importantly, taxes justified on both revenue generation and regulatory
grounds. For all we know, cigarettes and other forms of tobacco might be
168. Cf. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011).
169. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
170. See R.H. Coase, The Firm, the Market, and the Law, in R.H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE
MARKET, AND THE LAW 26, 26 (1988) (contending that the ubiquity of externalities implies
that the elimination of such phenomena is not always cost-justified).
171. See generally supra notes 46–49 and accompanying text.
172. Coase, supra note 170, at 26.
173. See also BORK, supra note 2, at 114–15 (making an unpersuasive argument that the
consideration of externalities in antitrust analysis is inappropriate because such a
consideration entails questions of income distribtion).
174. See Peter J. Hammer, Antitrust Beyond Competition: Market Failures, Total
Welfare, and the Challenge of Intramarket Second Best Trade-offs, 98 MICH. L. REV. 849,
887–89 (2000).
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overregulated.175 Any court that sought to incorporate the reduction in such
externalities as part of its evaluation of, say, a cartel of cigarette producers
would take on a task worthy of the most zealous central planner. If
entertaining a “reasonable price defense” sets sail on a “sea of doubt,” then
allowing for an “externalities defense” to cartel agreements will surely sink
the entire antitrust fleet.176
Similar considerations may well justify ignoring more traditional secondbest concerns. As some have explained, recognition of such a defense
would require tribunals and agencies to gather significantly more
information than necessary to evaluate the industry-specific consequences
of acts such as a merger or price fixing arrangement.177 For instance, in
addition to determining whether a transaction creates or facilitates the
exercise of market power, the tribunal would have to determine the
magnitude of any resulting output reduction as well as the size of the
resulting deadweight loss. The tribunal would also have to determine the
ultimate destination of the now-available various forms of resources (e.g.,
labor, energy, and raw materials) previously employed to produce the
forgone output.178 Such output reductions would, by definition, be “at the
margin” and leave most of an industry’s output intact. Moreover, having
determined this destination (or destinations), the tribunal would have to
determine whether such other markets are themselves beset with market
power and, if so, by how much—presumably defining relevant product and
geographic markets to do so. In the end, this process could lead to a
determination that the (marginal) resources in question flowed to markets
that were generally competitive or nearly so, thereby confirming, at great
cost, the conclusions of a partial equilibrium analysis. In the end, such a
long drawn out inquiry would impose significant costs on the parties and
the legal system while at the same time undermining the per se rule against
cartel pricing, for instance, by necessitating a fact-intensive analysis about
the collateral consequences of an admitted output reduction.179 Indeed, if
175. See POSNER, supra note 14, at 12–13 n.5 (questioning whether smoking in fact
imposes net external costs and noting that, in any event, “measuring [such costs], comparing
them with the social costs of merger-induced supracompetitive pricing, and evaluating the
social costs and benefits of the products that consumers deflected from cigarettes by that
pricing would substitute would be an unfeasible undertaking for the court in an antitrust
suit.”).
176. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 283–84 (6th Cir. 1898)
(asserting that some common law courts had “set sail on a sea of doubt” when they assumed
the power to ascertain whether horizontal cartels had set “reasonable” prices).
177. See BORK, supra note 2, at 113–14 (contending, persuasively, that antitrust courts
should ignore second-best considerations).
178. Cf. Hicks, supra note 91, at 114.
179. See BORK, supra note 2, at 114 (“In order to take into account second-best’s caution
in a price-fixing case, for example, the court would first have to measure the gap between
price and marginal cost—in itself an all but impossible task. Next, the court would have to
inquire whether there existed divergences between marginal cost and price in any industry
. . . to and from resources might move if the cartel were outlawed, and whether such
divergences in any such industry would probably be increased or lessened by outlawing the
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one presumes that the American economy is generally competitive, partly
as a result of antitrust regulation, then it stands to reason that most such
second-best arguments will fail “on the merits,” because the resources freed
up by anticompetitive output reductions will usually flow to competitive
markets or at least markets that are more competitive than those where the
challenged conduct takes place and thus not eliminate any distortions.180
As then-judge Breyer reminded us in a different context, antitrust is a costly
administrative system that cannot implement every nuance of an
economist’s model.181
Still, the partial equilibrium paradigm embraces other simplifying
assumptions, assumptions that may be less defensible. For one thing, like
the perfect competition model, the model ignores the existence and passage

price agreement. Finally, the court would have to judge whether the new equilibrium, across
all affected industries, would be better or worse for consumers than the present equilibrium.
The objection is not merely that every price-fixing case would take ten or fifteen years to try,
but that the task itself is beyond the capacity of any court or of any other institution.”);
Fisher & Lande, supra note 26, at 1626 n.172 (“Economists attempting to determine the
relevance of “second-best” outcomes in individual cases face a very difficult, timeconsuming, and expensive process. Rarely do they have sufficient data to incorporate
second-best factors into any particular antitrust analysis. To require antitrust policy to
consider “second-best” arguments would be burdensome and unworkable. One must treat
‘second best’ considerations as theoretical curiosities or abandon any hope of having a
theoretical basis for antitrust policy.” (citations omitted)); see also FTC v. Super. Ct. Trial
Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990).
180. Cf. Claus Thustrup Hansen, Second Best Antitrust in General Equilibrium: A
Special Case, 63 ECON. LETTERS 193 (1999) (concluding that antimonopoly regulation will
reduce welfare if a “large fraction” of the economy is monopolistic). Indeed, the seminal
study on the impact of market power on resource allocation concluded that the American
economy is quite competitive, with market-power distortions reducing GDP by a mere 0.1
percent. See Harberger, supra note 17. Based on this finding, Harberger concluded that
“[w]e can neglect monopoly elements and still gain a very good understanding of how our
economic process works and how our resources are allocated. When we are interested in the
big picture of our manufacturing economy, we need not apologize for treating it as
competitive, for in fact it is awfully close to being so.” Harberger’s findings are particularly
noteworthy, given that he studied the impact of monopoly during the 1920s, a period of
relatively lax antitrust enforcement. Subsequent studies have generally confirmed
Harberger’s conclusions that the welfare losses from exercises of market power are quite
small. See, e.g., Dean A. Worcester, New Estimates of the Welfare Loss to Monopoly, United
States: 1956–1969, 40 S. ECON. J. 234 (1978).
181. See Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 234 (1st Cir. 1983)
(“Nonetheless, while technical economic discussion helps to inform the antitrust laws, those
laws cannot precisely replicate the economists’ (sometimes conflicting) views. For, unlike
economics, law is an administrative system the effects of which depend upon the content of
rules and precedents only as they are applied by judges and juries in courts and by lawyers
advising their clients. Rules that seek to embody every economic complexity and
qualification may well, through the vagaries of administration, prove counter-productive,
undercutting the very economic ends they seek to serve. Thus, despite the theoretical
possibility of finding instances in which horizontal price fixing, or vertical price fixing, are
economically justified, the courts have held them unlawful per se, concluding that the
administrative virtues of simplicity outweigh the occasional ‘economic’ loss.”); see also
BORK, supra note 2, at 113 (“The theory does not address itself to the probability of the bad
result, but states it merely as a possible outcome.”).
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of time.182 That is, the transaction examined by the model takes place in an
instant, with market power and efficiencies manifesting themselves
immediately and simultaneously.183 Moreover, both market power and
efficiencies are implicitly assumed to be permanent.184 These assumptions,
of course, render it unnecessary to discount either impact when comparing
harms with benefits.185
Moreover, the model ignores the positive impact that efficiencies
resulting from such transactions have upon the welfare of participants,
including purchasers, in other markets. After all, within the trade-off
model, efficiencies manifest themselves as reduced costs per unit of
producing the industry’s remaining output.186 These efficiencies enhance
the welfare of producers and consumers, with the division between them
depending upon the extent to which the transaction results in market power
and thus above-cost pricing.187 If the merger results in higher prices, it is
said, firms have not passed on such efficiencies to purchasers but have
instead “pocketed” them.188 But of course these cost reductions, reflected
in a new cost curve, are more than just pecuniary accounting constructs that
influence firm profits. Instead, these reductions reflect the fact that industry
participants must now purchase and employ a smaller quantity of real
resources to produce any given unit of output. Thus, as other scholars have
recognized, these cost reductions will also manifest themselves as resources
freed up for other possible uses.189 Moreover, these resources will not sit
182. See FRANK M. MACHOVEC, PERFECT COMPETITION AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF
ECONOMICS 178–79 (1995) (describing perfect competition’s instantaneous market clearing);
HAYEK, supra note 137, at 96 (explaining that satisfaction of perfect competition’s various
assumptions results in instantaneous equilibrium); JOE BAIN, PRICE THEORY 14–15 (1952)
(explaining that price theory focuses on ascertaining the “end result” of responses to a “fixed
set of determinants” and does not generally incorporate questions regarding the passage of
time and movement from one equilibrium to the next); see also KNIGHT, supra note 137, at
77–82 (in perfect competition, economic adjustments occur immediately after the “brief
interval” during which production occurs).
183. See Williamson, supra note 20, at 21–23.
184. It should be noted that Williamson does consider the passage of time in one sense,
namely, he considers the possibility that, but for the merger, a firm or firms would realize the
same efficiencies via internal expansion and thus without merger-created market power. See
id. at 25–26.
185. Cf. id. (discounting to derive the present value of future efficiencies obtained by
means of future internal expansion, an alternative to immediate merger).
186. See supra notes 147–50 and accompanying text; see also CARLTON & PERLOFF,
supra note 44, at 798.
187. See Fisher & Lande, supra note 26.
188. See supra notes 67–69 and accompanying text.
189. See BORK, supra note 2, at 108 (“Cost reductions [from a merger to monopoly that
creates efficiencies] mean that the saved resources are freed up to produce elsewhere in the
economy.”); SCHERER, supra note 57, at 26 (explaining that the cost reduction resulting from
a monopolist’s realization of economies of scale frees up productive resources and thus
increases output in other markets); Blair & Sokol, supra note 37, at 490 (“Cost savings that
result from merger-specific productive efficiencies that do more than increase the merging
parties’ profits are important. Since resources are freed up, consumers benefit from lower
prices in other markets.”); Heyer, supra note 19, at 39–40 (explaining how a merger that
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idle; after all, the industry had to bid them away from other industries,
where firms were willing to pay a positive price for them.190 As a result,
such resources will presumably flow to other markets.191 More technically,
the newly created firm will demand fewer such inputs, thereby reducing
overall demand for them and reducing the price that firms in other markets
must pay for such inputs. As a result, firms in other markets will employ
more such inputs, increasing their own output as a result and at least partly
offsetting the reduction in output in the first market.192 Indeed, at least one
scholar has stated definitively that, where economies of scale lead to a
monopoly whose efficiencies outweigh the deadweight loss, such
monopolization will increase society’s overall total output, despite the
output reduction in the monopolized market.193
reduces production costs frees up resources for use elsewhere in the economy); Alan J.
Meese, Section 2 Enforcement and the Great Recession: Why Less (Enforcement) Might
Mean More (GDP), 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1633, 1674–75 (2012) (“Whether or not the
benefits of cost reductions are “passed on” to consumers in the relevant market, such
efficiencies will free up productive resources that will flow to other sectors in the economy
. . . . Because this resource flow will not enhance market power in other markets, output in
those markets will almost invariably increase.”); see also HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 86
(“As a matter of sound economics, the [total] economic welfare approach is almost always
preferable; most efficiencies have a way of trickling through the economy so that they
benefit everyone.”); Williamson, supra note 19, at 112 (contending that efficient resource
allocation is more important to long-run economic growth than effective macroeconomic
stabilization). Of course, monopolistic output reduction also frees up resources that can be
employed to increase production in other markets, but such reductions “by definition”
allocate resources to uses that produce less value than they would produce in the
monopolized market, with no offsetting improvement in productive efficiencies. See
SCHERER & ROSS, supra note 57, at 18–19 (“[F]ailure to maximize the value of the output
bundle and failure to maximize the sum of consumers’ plus producers’ surpluses are
conceptually identical manifestations of monopolistic resource misallocation.”). The only
exception, of course, is when conditions are such that the theory of second-best applies. See
supra notes 165–66 and accompanying text.
190. See GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 105 (1966) (“The cost of any
productive service to user A is the maximum amount it could produce elsewhere. The
foregone alternative is the cost.”); KNIGHT, supra note 137, at 92.
191. See Heyer, supra note 19, at 39–40; see also Meese, supra note 189, at 1675.
192. See generally LANCASTER, supra note 118, at 115–29. Cf. SCHERER & ROSS, supra
note 57, at 26 (explaining how a monopolist’s realization of economies of scale frees up
resources and increases output in other markets); id. at 23 & n.27 (explaining that such cost
reductions free up resources and thereby result in output increases in other sectors of the
economy).
193. See SCHERER & ROSS, supra note 57, at 26 (stating that “failure to maximize the
value of the output bundle and failure to maximize the sum of consumers’ plus producers’
surplus are conceptually identical manifestations of monopolistic resource misallocation.”);
id. at 22 (“Excess costs [due to productive inefficiency] reduce combined consumers’ plus
producers’ surplus just as monopolistic resource misallocation does, and a relatively small
unit cost elevation [resulting from the prohibition of monopoly that would otherwise result in
productive efficiencies] might deplete the surplus even more than a monopolistic price
elevation of appreciable proportions.”); id. at 28 (quoting Adam Smith for the proposition
that an individual producer labors in a competitive economy to make the whole produce as
great as possible); see also Williamson, supra note 19, at 21 (stating that the partial
equilibrium trade-off model can be employed to examine “the effects on resource
allocation”); id. at 22 n.4 (noting that the use of “dead-weight loss” to refer to monopolistic
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Moreover, output increases in other markets will presumably reduce
prices in such markets, thereby increasing the welfare of consumers in such
markets.194 Thus, an efficiency-generating transaction that increases prices
in one market will nonetheless increase output and reduce prices in other
markets. In these circumstances, application of a “purchaser welfare”
standard based on the partial equilibrium model and resulting condemnation
of a transaction that increases prices in one market will certainly reduce the
(potential) welfare of consumers in some other markets and may actually
reduce the overall welfare of purchasers throughout the economy.195
V. REFRAMING THE PURCHASER WELFARE V. TOTAL WELFARE DEBATE
As explained above, the partial equilibrium trade-off model provides an
incomplete account of the impact of transactions or practices that both
increase prices and also generate efficiencies. In particular, the model, by
hypothesis, excludes consideration of the impact of such efficiencies on
other markets. The model also excludes the possibility that the impact of
the transaction or practice might change over time. For instance, the model
excludes the possibility that a new entry might eventually dissipate any
market power, thereby ensuring that purchasers in the relevant market
realize the benefits of the transaction’s or practice’s efficiencies. This part
offers suggestions for how to reframe antitrust analysis to account for the
recognitions that (1) efficiencies generated in one market will impact other
markets and (2) the balance of a transaction’s or practice’s benefits and
harms in the relevant market might change over time.
A. Spatial Reframing
So far as the author is aware, no other scholar has examined the relevance
of such resource flows for the debate over the proper definition of
“consumer welfare.”196 Instead, contending camps repeatedly disagree
about whether tribunals should include the welfare of producers when
examining the welfare consequences of transactions that produce both
misallocation is too restrictive because productive inefficiency is also a deadweight loss). In
short, Scherer agrees with Williamson that the realization of productive efficiencies will
enhance allocative efficiency and also assumes that a practice that increases total surplus in
one market will increase the nation’s overall economic welfare, that is, the “value of the
output bundle.”
194. See Blair & Sokol, supra note 37, at 484–85; Meese, supra note 189, at 1673–76.
195. See Meese, supra note 189, at 1673–76.
196. But see id. at 1675 (“[I]n some cases, conduct that violates a consumer welfare
effects standard might actually reduce the aggregate price level, by freeing up so many
resources that output increases in other markets collectively lower prices that exceed the
price increase in the monopolized market.”); id. at 1675 n.261 (“In such cases, application of
the consumer welfare effects standard would actually reduce consumer welfare as a whole,
even if one excluded producers from the definition of ‘consumer’ and included only those
individuals who purchase products from producers. Put another way, application of a total
welfare standard may in fact improve the welfare of such narrowly defined consumers more
than application of a standard that purportedly seeks to maximize only their welfare.”).
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market power and efficiencies.197 This narrow framing of the normative
question, of course, is a testament to the hold that the partial equilibrium
paradigm exerts over the mind of antitrust scholars, practitioners, and
regulatory economists who seek to tackle antitrust problems.198
However, the fact that such market-centric framing is understandable
does not thereby justify ignoring the positive impact of a transaction on
consumers in other markets. After all, the ordinary rationales for ignoring
other extramarket welfare consequences may simply not apply when such
consequences take the form of efficiency-driven resource flows to other
markets. For instance, as mentioned earlier, antitrust generally ignores the
possibility that the naked exercise of market power and output reduction in
one market can actually increase overall welfare by redeploying resources,
increasing output, and reducing distortions in other, previously
monopolized markets.199 By contrast, recognition of the impact of
efficiency-induced resource flows is more straightforward and less
costly.200 For one thing, the extramarket impact of such resource flows is
unambiguously positive, and the impact generally does not depend upon the
competitive conditions in other markets.201 By contrast, and as explained
previously, the chance that naked output reductions in one market will
actually increase overall welfare is only that, a chance, and not a very large
chance in an economy that is generally competitive, in part because of

197. See supra notes 8–15 and accompanying text.
198. See Meese, supra note 110, at 519–21 (describing the hold that the partial
equilibrium paradigm has on antitrust scholars, judges, and practitioners).
199. See supra notes 165–66, 177–81 and accompanying text.
200. Note here that “recognition” of such efficiencies for the purpose of antitrust analysis
does not necessarily mean case-by-case consideration of such efficiencies.
201. That is, whether or not other markets are monopolized, resource flows to such
markets will result in output increases, without any corresponding output decreases in the
market where efficiencies are realized in the first place. Thus, the impact of such flows will
generally be positive. The only exception will be in those instances in which output
increases in other markets produce negative externalities that are inefficient. In such cases,
the movement of resources from the original market to other markets could reduce output.
There are, however, three separate reasons that this possibility should not undermine the
recognition of such extramarket efficiency effects. First, other legal regimes should
minimize the extent of such inefficient negative externalities. Second, even if a legal regime
does not currently address such externalities in a particular industry, an increase in the
magnitude of such externalities might induce political action creating such a regime (though,
of course, the cost of the resulting regulatory regime would itself qualify as an externality,
though presumably one less costly than the underlying externality that the regime combats).
Third, it seems at least equally likely that production in some industries will be characterized
by positive externalities, the presence of which will actually magnify the benefits of resource
flows from the original market to others. Thus, failure to recognize such resource flows
could “throw the baby out with the bath water,” by depriving society of the benefits of
output increases, including those in markets characterized by positive externalities, so as to
eliminate the occasional instance in which such increases take place in markets with
uncorrected inefficient externalities.
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robust antitrust regulation.202 Moreover, market-power induced output
reductions generally occur only “at the margins,” thus freeing up only
modest resources for use elsewhere. By contrast, productive efficiencies
are, by their nature, inframarginal, that is, apply to every unit of output that
a firm or firms continue to produce after the transaction that results in the
efficiencies.203 Thus, the realization of such efficiencies will have a larger
(necessarily positive) impact than the (ambiguous) impact of
anticompetitive output reductions.204
As a result, the benefits of recognizing the impact of efficiency-generated
resource flows will be significantly greater than the benefits of recognizing
traditional second best possibilities, for instance. But what about the costs?
As an initial matter, the calculation of the magnitude of such efficiencies
will not entail any costs over and above those that tribunals must otherwise
incur if they have already recognized an efficiency defense as does, say,
merger law and section 1’s Rule of Reason.205 Moreover, recognition of
such efficiencies would have no impact on the costs (or benefits) of
administering the per se rule against price fixing, which, of course, assumes
the absence of efficiencies.206 Finally, and as explained in greater detail
below, the magnitude of cost reductions itself serves as a proxy for the
value that resources will produce in other markets.207 In short, the cost of
recognizing such extramarket impacts are relatively low, while the benefits
of doing so are relatively high.
Recognition that transaction-specific productive efficiencies free up new
resources for use in other markets requires a reframing of the debate
between the “purchaser welfare” and “total welfare” schools of thought.
For one thing, this realization undermines the supposed conflict between
“producers” who realize efficiencies on the one hand, and “consumers” who
purchase from these producers, on the other.208 This debate, as explained
earlier, rests upon an assumption common to both camps, namely, that the
owners of firms who exercise monopoly power resulting in increased prices
202. See supra notes 179–81 and accompanying text (explaining that, if most of the
economy’s markets are competitive, anticompetitive output reduction in one market will
likely reduce overall welfare).
203. See, e.g., CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 44, at 798 (“The larger the quantity [still]
sold in the marketplace, the more important the efficiency gains, and the larger the area of
the rectangle compared to the triangle.”); Williamson, supra note 20, at 21–23. Indeed, to
the extent that the realization of efficiencies mitigates the extent of monopolistic output
reduction, the magnitude of realized efficiencies will be that much larger, thereby further
bolstering this distinction.
204. I am grateful to Sarah Stafford for this insight.
205. See supra notes 79–83, 88–89 and accompanying text.
206. See supra notes 178–82 and accompanying text (explaining how incorporation of
second-best considerations into antitrust enforcement would increase the costs and reduce
the benefits of the per se rule); see also N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5
(1958) (conduct must always or almost always lack redeeming virtues to be unlawful per se).
207. See infra notes 218–21 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 96–102 and accompanying text (collecting various sources defining
the debate in these terms).
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necessarily “pocket” efficiencies that are not passed on to consumers,
pocketing that is irrelevant for the total welfare school but dispositive for
the purchaser welfare school.209 Instead, this insight establishes that, in
addition to increasing producer surplus, efficiencies realized in one market
will also improve the welfare of some consumers in one or more other
markets.210 Thus, any claim that producers simply “pocket” the fruits of
efficiencies, to the detriment of all consumers, is an economic fiction,
perpetuated (intentionally) by the partial equilibrium model, a fiction that
ignores the full allocational consequences of such transactions.211
Therefore, while banning a transaction that increases prices but also creates
efficiencies will protect purchasers in one market, such intervention will
necessarily and simultaneously injure purchasers in other markets. Thus,
while purporting to champion the interests of purchasers, proponents of the
purchaser welfare approach are instead elevating the welfare of some
purchasers over others.212 At the same time, proponents of a total welfare
standard have perhaps needlessly characterized producers as consumers and
thereby declared producer surplus to be part of the consumer welfare
calculus, adding confusion to the debate.
To be sure, the extramarket impact of any given transaction might appear
to be relatively small, perhaps indiscernible, because resources freed up by
the realization of productive efficiencies might in some cases be dispersed

209. See supra notes 96–102 and accompanying text.
210. See infra notes 218–21 and accompanying text (explaining that the realization of
productive efficiencies improves the allocation of resources as much as elimination of
monopoly). Of course, the complete specification of this claim requires the identification of
the relevant “consumers” or “purchasers” in other markets. It would be tempting to equate
these purchasers with the “ultimate consumers” in other markets. However, the purchaser
welfare standard does not purport to define “purchaser” or “consumer” so narrowly.
Moreover, innumerable Sherman Act decisions treat business firms as “purchasers” or
“consumers,” entitled to obtain treble damages resulting from cartel pricing or unlawful
monopolization. See, e.g., Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481,
488–94 (1968) (holding that a firm could obtain treble damages based upon the magnitude of
the monopoly overcharge resulting from unlawful exclusionary practices); see also Ill. Brick
Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977) (holding that masonry firms were the only proper
plaintiffs for challenging a cartel of brick manufacturers). As a result, this Article assumes
that firms in other markets that purchase inputs freed up by the realization of efficiencies are
“purchasers” for purposes of applying the purchaser welfare standard. If, on the other hand,
only ultimate consumers count as “purchasers,” calculation of the impact of a transaction
upon “purchasers” in other markets would require calculation of the extent to which firms in
those other markets “pass through” cost savings to ultimate purchasers. I am grateful to
Sarah Stafford for calling my attention to the pass-through question.
211. Cf. supra notes 68–70 and accompanying text (explaining the claim by proponents
of the purchaser welfare approach that producers simply “pocket” the proceeds of
efficiencies, at the expense of marketplace consumers).
212. As explained earlier, this is also true when, say, a purchaser welfare standard results
in the condemnation of an efficiency-creating merger that results in lower prices for most
purchasers because the defendants, via price discrimination, are able to raise prices to a small
subset of consumers in an otherwise larger relevant market. See supra note 10 and
accompanying text.
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across several markets.213 Though, here again, it is useful to recall that
such efficiencies will be inframarginal in nature and thus be larger perhaps
than initially supposed.214 Moreover, while the resource effects of any
given transaction may be relatively small in this sense, antitrust rules must
be designed with a large class of transactions, practices, and agreements in
mind. By analogy, the Sherman Act would not tolerate price fixing
agreements between small firms because no single agreement would have a
large impact on resource allocation. Instead, the Sherman Act bans the
entire class of such agreements. Taken together, the various efficient
transactions, practices, and contracts that individually offend a purchaser
welfare standard may, over time, improve the overall welfare of all
purchasers in the economy, viewed as a class, including those in the
markets where such transactions take place. Indeed, some purchasers in the
market where a challenged practice takes place may also be purchasers in
markets to which resources flow and increase output; purchases in the
original market may constitute only a fraction of total purchases. Because
each consumer participates in several markets at once, application of a total
welfare standard that validates transactions that, on balance, enhance the
allocation of resources could actually increase the welfare of all purchasers
over time.215 If so, then a standard that validates all efficient transactions
will satisfy the pareto-like quality of the purchaser welfare standard.216

213. See generally J.R. Hicks, The Foundations of Welfare Economics, 49 ECON. J. 696,
709–10 (explaining that, under conditions of perfect competition, the elimination of a firm in
one market will free up resources that “will have to be scattered about at the margins” of
other uses). But see Harberger, supra note 161, at 791 (contending that, in some cases,
extramarket effects will be concentrated in a few markets).
214. See supra notes 203–05 and accompanying text.
215. Cf. Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, supra note 11, at 1703 (“In the long run
consumers gain the most from a policy that emphasizes allocative and productive
efficiency.”). Indeed, assuming a fixed rate of economic growth, a total welfare approach
could also increase aggregate purchaser welfare in the long run, as it will result in larger
GDP and thus a larger base on which such a fixed rate would be applied (and compounded).
Of course, some have made similar claims in support of an efficiency norm for tort law. See
generally Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N.Y. 476, 484–91 (1873) (contending that a negligence
standard for tort law, while depriving some victims of the chance to recover damages for
certain injuries, will nonetheless improve such individuals’ welfare, by encouraging
economic activity); WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF TORT LAW (1987) (contending that parties who “lose” from a particular efficient rule of
tort law may nonetheless support an overall efficiency norm because such a norm would, on
balance, improve their welfare). Proponents of zoning regulations have made similar claims,
namely, that such interference with the manner in which one uses his property will enhance
the welfare of those whose property is regulated by creating a mutual reciprocity of
advantage. See Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 394–95 (1926). In the
same way, allowing purchasers to challenge efficient transactions simply because they
increase prices in a particular market may in fact reduce the welfare of such market
participants.
216. Cf. HOVENKAMP, supra note 2, at 83–84 (explaining distinction between Pareto
superiority and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency criteria and that the total welfare standard rests on
the latter).
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How is it, then, that the antitrust law might reframe current doctrine so as
to recognize the impact of efficiencies on other markets? First, it seems
appropriate to reiterate that, despite the tendency of antitrust experts to
distinguish between them, productive efficiency and deadweight loss are
two sides of the same coin.217 That is, realization of productive efficiencies
can “improve” the allocation of resources and thus individual “want
satisfaction” just as much and in the same way as a monopolistic
misallocation of resources can reduce such satisfaction.218 Thus, a
technological innovation that reduces the cost of producing a particular
good improves the allocation of resources just as much as the elimination of
a naked cartel or nonefficient monopoly.219 As F.M. Scherer observed
more than three decades ago, a monopoly that rests upon significant
economies of scale will—if it produces efficiencies that exceed deadweight
losses—result in a net increase in the value of total output produced by the
economy, as the value of output increases in other markets exceeds the
value destroyed by the deadweight loss in the monopolized market.220
Once we recognize that efficient conduct affects numerous markets at
once and improves the economy’s net allocation of resources, we can no
longer rely exclusively upon a partial equilibrium model to conduct the
antitrust inquiry. Instead, we can employ the typical aggregate demand and
aggregate supply model from macroeconomic theory—a general
equilibrium model—to give content to F.M. Scherer’s observation.221 If
Scherer is correct, and there is no reason to believe he is not, then we can
217. See supra notes 153–54 and accompanying text; cf. BORK, supra note 2, at 104–06
(distinguishing between productive and allocative efficiency).
218. See supra notes 153–54 and accompanying text.
219. See N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 519, 523–24 (1998)
(explaining how technological advances can enhance productivity and thus increase a
nation's total output).
220. See supra note 193 and accompanying text. This conclusion, it should be noted, is
consistent with the observation that a firm’s costs equal the value of the output these
resources would have produced in other markets. STIGLER, supra note 190, at 105 (“The cost
of any productive service to user A is the maximum amount it could produce elsewhere. The
foregone alternative is the cost.”). Thus, the magnitude of cost reduction serves as a proxy
for the value of output increases in other markets.
221. See N. GREGORY MANKIW, MACROECONOMICS 74 (7th ed. 2010) (explaining that the
basic model of the macroeconomy is general equilibrium in nature, because it incorporates
various interactions that determine the overall supply and demand for goods and services);
see also Williamson, supra note 161, at 702 n.10 (“When changes in the relevant market do
affect the general economy, a general equilibrium analysis, in which prices and quantities for
all markets must be determined together, is usually appropriate.”). In other contexts,
scholars have employed general equilibrium models to determine the macroeconomic impact
of industry-by-industry state-imposed cartelization. See, e.g., Harold L. Cole & Lee E.
Ohanian, New Deal Policies and the Persistence of the Great Depression: A General
Equilibrium Analysis, 112 J. POL. ECON. 779, 784 (2004) (studying the impact of the
National Industrial Recovery Act, which imposed industrial and labor cartels, and the
National Labor Relations Act, which imposed labor cartels, upon GDP); Christina D. Romer,
Why Did Prices Rise in the 1930s?, 59 J. ECON. HIST. 167, 187–93 (1999) (testing the impact
of the National Industrial Recovery Act upon economy-wide wages and prices during the
Great Depression).

2013]

THE (FALSE?) CHOICE

2245

model the net impact of such monopolization (or a merger that results in
such monopolization), as a shift in the long run aggregate supply curve.222
This “curve” is in fact vertical, and it represents the value of the output that
the economy can produce when all of its resources are fully employed.223
The realization of technological or other efficiencies by merger or otherwise
will allow a firm or firms to employ a less resource-intensive production
process.224 By hypothesis, the resulting improvement in resource allocation
will more than outweigh the deadweight loss and resulting misallocation
due to market power.225 As a result, the economy will be capable of
producing more output—with the very same resources—than it was able to
produce before the transaction, with the result that the aggregate supply
curve will shift to right.226 Such a shift is analogous to the macroeconomic
impact of research and development and resulting innovation, encouraged
by the prospect of obtaining a patent, for instance.227 Like a merger to
monopoly, such patents also result in above-cost pricing and a resulting
allocative loss.228 Society nonetheless tolerates such harms because it
believes that the resulting improvement in potential output and economic

222. See RUDIGER DORNBUSCH, STANLEY FISCHER & RICHARD STARTZ,
MACROECONOMICS 101 (11th ed. 2011) (“The aggregate supply curve describes, for each
given price level, the quantity of output firms are willing to supply.”).
223. See id. (“The classical [vertical] supply curve is based on the assumption that the
labor market is in equilibrium with full employment of the labor force.”); MANKIW, supra
note 125, at 272–73 (describing the long-run aggregate supply curve as a vertical
representation of the value of output that society could produce with fully employed
resources).
224. See WILLIAM BOYES & MICHAEL MELVIN, FUNDAMENTALS OF ECONOMICS 263 (5th
ed. 2011) (explaining that technological innovation will increase potential output).
225. See supra notes 34–36 and accompanying text (explaining how a transaction that
results in relatively minor cost savings can increase overall welfare despite resulting market
power and price increases). Of course, if the impact of misallocation resulting from market
power and higher prices exceeds the magnitude of productive efficiencies, then both the
“total welfare” and “purchaser welfare” standards will condemn such a transaction. This
Article focuses on those instances in which efficiencies are sufficiently large that the two
standards will produce different results.
226. See generally MANKIW, supra note 219, at 519 (explaining how an improvement in
the utilization of resources can enhance an economy’s overall productivity); id. at 692
(explaining how a technological improvement can increase an economy’s overall
productivity); see also ARNOLD C. HARBERGER, USAID, ON THE PROCESS OF GROWTH AND
ECONOMIC POLICY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 3 (2005) (“It is absolutely crucial to recognize
that all economic growth takes place at the level of the productive enterprise.”); id. at 4
(explaining that so-called “real cost reduction” is the most important driver of economic
growth and results in such growth even when other components are stagnant).
227. See BOYES & MELVIN, supra note 224, at 263 (“Technological innovations allow
businesses to increase the productivity of their existing resources. As new technology is
adopted the amount of output that can be produced by each unit of input increases, moving
the aggregate supply curve to the right.”); MANKIW, supra note 125, at 535 (explaining how
the patent system encourages innovation that results in the growth of potential national
output); id. at 692–93 (explaining how technological improvement will result in a shift in the
long-run aggregate supply curve).
228. See CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 44, at 689.

2246

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

growth exceeds the offsetting welfare losses.229 Indeed Professors Areeda
and Turner expressly analogized the use of “superior skill, foresight and
industry” to obtain and protect a monopoly—what they called “competition
on the merits”—to the protection of a monopoly via a valid patent, opining
that antitrust law should not seek to prevent monopoly pricing that resulted
from such efficiencies.230 A merger or other transaction or practice that
creates efficiencies that exceed deadweight allocative losses is a classic
example of such “competition on the merits” and will presumably increase
potential output.231
Of course, other things being equal, such a shift in the long-run aggregate
supply curve will reduce the nation’s aggregate price level, which is set by
the interaction of the aggregate demand and aggregate supply curves.232
Moreover, such a reduction will reflect higher aggregate output and, as a
result, greater aggregate consumer surplus.233 It would therefore seem that
a merger or other transaction that results in efficiencies that exceed the
allocative losses resulting from market power will necessarily increase the
aggregate welfare of the economy’s purchasers.
There are, however, two caveats to this analysis. First, it may be that
everything else is not equal. For instance, nothing about the account just
provided excludes the fact that the challenged practice or transaction will
229. See MANKIW, supra note 125, at 535; CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 44, at 688–91
(“[A] patent causes a pricing distortion—a monopoly price—after a discovery. The
government is faced with a trade-off: the longer the patent, the greater the inducement for
research but the larger the cost due to more research projects and the monopoly loss.”);
SCHERER & ROSS, supra note 57, at 450–54; see also Shuintin Yao & Lydia Gan, Monopoly
Innovation and Welfare Effects, 4 ECON. E-JOURNAL (Oct. 4, 2010), available at
http://www.economics-ejournal.org/economics/journalarticles/2010-27.
230. “[A] monopolist whose power was legitimately acquired by patents cannot be denied
monopoly profits without subverting the purpose of the patent laws. Similarly, denying
monopoly profits to those whose power was obtained by superior skill, foresight, and
industry could eliminate the primary incentive to develop such competitive skill. Finally,
price restrictions would have perverse effects on the efficiency and innovation aspects of a
monopolist’s on-going performance by eliminating the reward.” See Areeda & Turner, supra
note 72, at 707; id. at 706–07 (equating “competition on the merits” with realization of
efficiencies and pricing at or above cost).
231. See BOYES & MELVIN, supra note 227, at 263 (explaining that technological
innovation will increase potential output). As explained earlier, courts have considered the
realization of efficiencies via economies of scale, for instance, as quintessential “competition
on the merits,” lawful per se under section 2 of the Sherman Act, even if such conduct
creates or protects a monopoly. See supra notes 44–45 and accompanying text. Moreover,
the Supreme Court recently agreed with Professors Areeda and Turner, opining that the
prospect of obtaining and enjoying a monopoly provides incentives for innovation. See
Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004)
(“The mere possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant charging of monopoly
prices, is not only not unlawful; it is an important element of the free-market system. The
opportunity to charge monopoly prices—at least for a short period—is what attracts
‘business acumen’ in the first place; it induces risk taking that produces innovation and
economic growth.”).
232. See MANKIW, supra note 221, at 272–73 & figs.9–7.
233. Id.
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increase prices for those purchasers in the relevant market where the
transaction or practice takes place.234 Moreover, such a price increase will
itself dampen aggregate demand by reducing the value of the real balances
that such consumers hold, raising interest rates, and reducing consumption
and investment.235 Such a concern is illusory, however, for two reasons.
First, when purchasers in the relevant market pay higher prices, producers
reap the benefits, increasing the value of their own real balances and
thereby any price effect on aggregate demand. Indeed, to the extent that
producers “pocket” any efficiencies, their real balances will rise more than
any reduction in purchasers’ real balances, thus implying an increase in
overall aggregate demand.236 Second, when prices fall in other markets,
purchasers in such markets will also experience higher real balances,
increasing their demand for goods. These two effects account for the
downward movement along the given aggregate demand curve and
resulting increase in output due to the shift in aggregate supply.
But this brings us to a second possible caveat. That is, the analysis thus
far, by focusing on aggregates, includes the consumer surplus that
producers in the relevant market derive from additional expenditures upon
newly produced goods. These expenditures, of course, come at the expense
of purchasers in the relevant market, who have paid higher prices and thus
been the victims of income transfers to producers.237 As a result, one might
argue, we cannot be certain that the resulting increase in aggregate
consumer surplus will always reflect a true net increase in the welfare of
those who are purchasers simpliciter, without accidentally including the
enhanced (purchaser) welfare of producers who reap the fruits of monopoly
power.
If this second caveat is valid, then we cannot simply assume that any net
efficient transaction will result in a net improvement in purchaser surplus,
234. See supra notes 29–36 and accompanying text (describing the disagreement between
the “total welfare” and “purchaser welfare” schools about the proper treatment of conduct
that both raises prices and generates efficiencies).
235. See DORNBUSCH ET AL., supra note 222, at 244–45; see also DON PATINKIN, MONEY,
INTEREST, AND PRICES: AN INTEGRATION OF MONETARY AND VALUE THEORY 17–21 (2d abr.
ed. 1989) (describing the separate so-called “real balance effect,” whereby an increase in real
balances increases aggregate wealth and thus stimulates consumption for that reason alone).
236. Cf. SCHERER & ROSS, supra note 57, at 23 n.7 (“For the low cost monopolist, that
rectangle [reflecting efficiencies] is profit rather than cost. Oversimplifying somewhat, the
monopolist’s profit provides the purchasing power with which this additional output
(presumably from other sectors of the economy) can be purchased for the monopolist’s
stockholder’s consumption.”). There is another way to characterize these phenomena within
the confines of this model. Succinctly, a transaction that creates efficiencies that exceed any
allocative losses will shift the aggregate supply curve to the right, without impacting the
location of the aggregate demand curve. Instead, the net increase in real balances and
resulting increased demand will manifest itself as a movement along the aggregate demand
curve, downward and to the right.
237. See id. (“For the low cost monopolist, . . . . the monopolist’s profit provides the
purchasing power with which this additional output (presumably from other sectors of the
economy) can be purchased for the monopolist’s stockholder’s consumption.”).
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properly defined, even though the result will be an increase in GDP.
Instead, we might have to settle for a case-by-case determination of the
impact of a challenged practice or transaction on the overall welfare of
purchasers, including those in other markets.238 Such an analysis would
entail an examination of the relative magnitude of reductions in purchaser
surplus in the original market, on the one hand, and cost reductions, on the
other.239 These cost reductions, in turn, would serve as proxies for cost
reductions in other markets and thus increase consumer surplus in such
markets.240 In some cases, that surplus will exceed the reduction in
purchaser surplus in the original market. In other cases, it will not. In any
event, a faithful implementation of a true purchaser welfare standard would
require the enforcement agencies and courts to determine and compare the
relative magnitude of these two impacts on purchaser welfare. Failure to do
so would bias antitrust law and policy in favor of purchasers in the relevant
market and against those in other markets, while at the same time,
dampening GDP and stultifying economic growth for the reasons outlined
above.241
To be sure, such a case-by-case analysis will be somewhat more costly
than simply determining whether a challenged practice, restraint, or
transaction reduces purchaser welfare in the original market. However, the
prospect of such additional costs does not necessarily undermine the
argument for such an approach. After all, resulting improvements in
purchaser welfare may well exceed the additional costs of making such
determinations. Moreover, such an approach will validate some efficient
transactions that a partial equilibrium purchaser welfare standard would
otherwise condemn, thereby freeing up resources that would more than
offset the additional resources expended to make this determination.242
Thus, such a system would in a sense both “pay for itself” and, in addition,
increase the welfare of purchasers.
238. Cf. Harberger, supra note 161, at 789–91 (contending that economists should be
willing to examine the impact of a proposed policy on more than one market).
239. Thus, one could imagine a transaction that creates significant efficiencies that greatly
exceed any reduction in purchaser surplus in the relevant market. In such cases, it seems
possible that resource flows to other markets will result in a net increase in aggregate
purchaser surplus. Indeed, one scholar, otherwise supportive of a purchaser welfare
standard, would not apply such a standard if “the aggregate efficiency costs of doing so
would be large.” See Baker, supra note 8, at 522.
240. See STIGLER, supra note 190, at 105 (“The cost of any productive service to user A is
the maximum amount it could produce elsewhere. The foregone alternative is the cost.”);
See also KNIGHT, supra note 137, at 92–93; Fink, supra note 161, at 15 (explaining that cost
curves in original partial equilibrium market reflect the “value of using resources in other
industries”).
241. Of course, such an analysis would require a determination of the relevant purchaser
for the purpose of implementing the purchaser welfare standard. See supra note 210 and
accompanying text.
242. While additional administrative costs would be a one-time expenditure, efficiencies
would be permanent, thereby justifying the presumption that such efficiencies would exceed
these administrative costs.
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There is, of course, another approach that could improve the welfare of
purchasers even more, at least in the longer run. That is, the enforcement
agencies and tribunals could simply validate all practices, restraints, and
transactions that increase overall welfare (and thus GDP), without regard to
whether the transaction results in a net improvement in purchaser welfare,
recognizing that such transactions will necessarily increase the welfare of
some purchasers, albeit not purchasers in the relevant market and, perhaps,
not purchasers overall. In addition to generating additional wealth, such an
approach could also improve overall purchaser welfare in the long run, even
if some transactions allowed by this standard reduce it in particular cases.
Put another way, the population of efficient transactions that offend the
current purchaser welfare standard may, when viewed as a whole, increase
total purchaser welfare, even if some individual transactions do not. If so,
then validating all restraints, practices, or transactions that increase total
welfare would also increase overall purchaser welfare. In this way, society
could “have its cake and eat it too,” that is, increase its total welfare and
potential output while at the same time increasing the overall welfare of
purchasers, albeit not as much as a more finely honed, case-by-case inquiry
into the impact of a challenged transaction, practice or restraint on
purchaser welfare.243
B. Temporal (Re)Framing
As noted earlier, the partial equilibrium model assumes that market
power and efficiencies arise simultaneously and that both effects continue at
the same magnitude in perpetuity.244 Once a monopolist, always a
monopolist, the model assumes. In so doing, the model tracks the perfect
competition model, which also suspends the operation of time and assumes
that economic adjustments take place in an instant.245
The exclusion of time can produce misleading results, whether one
adopts a “purchaser welfare” or total welfare approach to the statute. In
particular, this assumption will in some cases force courts to ban
transactions that will plainly improve the discounted present wealth of
purchasers in the relevant market by reducing prices for all the market’s
purchasers over the medium and long runs. Take, for example, a merger
that results in high levels of concentration as well as efficiencies. Assume
further that, while substantial, the efficiencies are not large enough to
counteract the impact (upon price) of market power. Finally, assume that
new entry will be “likely” and “sufficient” to combat any exercise of market
power (that is, to drive prices back to pretransaction levels), but that such
entry will not take place soon enough to be “timely” under governing
enforcement policies and/or case law to counteract a prima facie case of
243. Thus, such a standard could both generate wealth overall and enjoy wide support
among purchasers.
244. See supra notes 184–86 and accompanying text.
245. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
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anticompetitive harm.246 Under case law and prior agency guidelines, any
entry that took more than two years was insufficiently “timely,” with some
exceptions, thereby resulting in condemnation of the transaction.247 More
recent guidelines seem to contemplate an even smaller window. In
particular, these guidelines provide that the prospect of entry will only
defeat a prima facie case if such entry will occur rapidly enough to prevent
“significant” anticompetitive harm, which the guidelines equate with
increased prices.248 It thus seems possible that entry, even if “likely” and
“sufficient,” will not defeat a prima facie case even if it will take place
within two years because, in the meantime, marketplace consumers may
suffer higher prices, if only temporarily, for a nontrivial (“significant”)
period of time.249
Yet, even if entry is not “timely” within the meaning of governing
guidelines or case law, it may still occur, thereby counteracting any market
power after the relevant timeliness window closes. Moreover, if such entry
does occur, and if it is likely and sufficient to counteract any exercise of
market power, then market prices will fall to the new, lower cost of
production and thus to below premerger levels, thereby increasing the
postentry welfare of purchasers compared to what their welfare would have
been during the same period without the transaction. Here again, then,
banning a transaction because it will reduce the immediate, short-run
welfare of purchasers could reduce the overall welfare of such purchasers in
the longer run.

246. See FTC v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 34, 54–58 (D.D.C. 1998)
(articulating the requirement that predicted entry be timely, likely, and sufficient to rebut a
prima facie case); FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066, 1086–88 (D.D.C. 1997) (same);
2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 87, § 9 (same); DEP’T OF JUSTICE AND
FED. TRADE COMM’N JOINT MERGER GUIDELINES § 3.0 (1992) [hereinafter 1992 JOINT
MERGER GUIDELINES] (superceded) (same). It should be noted that whether entry is in fact
likely may depend upon the source of the efficiencies in question. For instance, if such
efficiencies rest upon economies of scale that new entrants cannot replicate, then entry may
not occur in the short or even medium run. See TIBOR SCITOVSKY, WELFARE AND
COMPETITION 332–33 (1951). Even here, however, growth in the market may eventually
make room for one or more additional entrants. Or, technology might change in a way that
eliminates the incumbent’s cost advantage.
247. See Cardinal Health, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 55–56 (articulating and applying this
requirement); 1992 JOINT MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 246, § 3.2 (superceded) (“The
Agency generally will consider timely only those committed entry alternatives that can be
achieved within two years from initial planning to significant market impact.”). The same
guidelines provide that entry outside the two-year window could be considered timely if
such entry “would deter or counteract the competitive effects of concern [i.e., immediate
post-transaction price increases] within the two year period and subsequently.” Id.
248. See 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 9, § 9.1 (providing that
entry will only be deemed “timely” if “the impact of entrants in the relevant market [will] be
rapid enough that customers are not significantly harmed by the merger, despite any
anticompetitive harm that occurs prior to the entry”).
249. The new Guidelines do not indicate whether they define “significant” in relative
terms (i.e., as a percentage of total sales) or in gross terms (as in a “significant dollar
amount”).
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This insight applies beyond the merger context, to any context in which
eventual entry could induce parties to pass on once-”pocketed” efficiencies
to purchasers.250 Moreover, if valid, this insight could require the
adjustment of standards governing entry and efficiencies so as to recognize
the possible symbiosis between the two standards. In particular, where
proponents of a merger or other practice show that the challenged
arrangement will raise prices but also result in efficiencies, courts and
agencies should entertain arguments that entry more than two years after the
transaction will, because of the efficiencies in question, result in prices that
are lower than those that existed before the transaction.251
To be sure, the analysis thus far assumes that the individuals who are
purchasers at the time of the transaction will also be purchasers into the
indefinite future, thereby allowing future price reductions to counteract the
impact of immediate (but admittedly temporary) posttransaction price
increases, thus ensuring that the transaction does not harm a single
purchaser. This assumption is, of course, unrealistic. In reality, the
composition of the class of purchasers will change over time. Indeed,
short-run price increases will induce some purchasers to turn elsewhere, and
eventual price reductions might not bring these purchasers back. Moreover,
some products—think refrigerators and dishwashers—are such that the
market, at least at plausible prices, consists of different purchasers each
year. Finally, new purchasers might enter the market over time as, say, they
become old enough to drive or to operate an iPhone. As a result, the sort of
temporal reframing suggested here would necessarily contemplate some
permanent injury to purchasers, so as to increase aggregate purchaser
welfare. At the same time, banning efficient, price-raising practices would
prefer present consumers to those who will be purchasers in the future and,
in addition, reduce long-run overall purchaser welfare.

250. See generally Meese, supra note 189, at 1676 (discussing similar considerations in
the section 2 context). Of course, as explained earlier, such efficiencies likely already
reduced prices in other markets. See supra notes 190–95 and accompanying text.
251. Assume, for instance, that premerger prices are $100 per unit. Assume further that,
after the merger, prices rise to $110 per unit for two years. Finally, assume that the new
entry occurs in the third year, forcing the newly merged firm to pass along efficiencies to
purchasers, thereby reducing market prices to $95 per unit in perpetuity. Given plausible
discount rates, the present value of such expected price reductions would exceed the shortterm harm to purchasers in the relevant market from the exercise of market power.

